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ABSTRACT
In the modern era, as the cooperation between States in military and
counter-terrorism efforts increases, so does the risk that a State will facilitate
the grave crimes of another State through its political, military, or economic
assistance. One of the most prominent recent examples is Russia’s support to
the Assad regime in Syria, despite the atrocities the Assad regime committed
against its own people. This raises the question: What legal obligations do
States have to refrain from assisting other States in committing grave interna-
tional crimes?
This Article argues that much like there is an oft-cited responsibility to pro-
tect (R2P), which obligates States to protect the human rights of people in other
countries when their own governments are unwilling or unable to do so, there
is an analogous duty to refrain (D2R) from aiding and abetting other States
who commit grave violations of human rights, like genocide and crimes against
humanity. Drawing from existing sources of international law, this Article ar-
gues that D2R already constitutes a binding principle of international law. In
addition, this Article makes a significant contribution to the current scholar-
ship on State responsibility by exploring the factors that contribute to impunity
for State complicity in international wrongdoing. The author contends that a
narrower focus on State complicity in crimes that constitute violations of jus
cogens norms would strengthen its enforcement.
The Article then concludes by proposing novel ideas for more effective en-
forcement of D2R through bilateral agreements and the employment of sanc-
tioning powers of the United Nations General Assembly under the Uniting for
Peace Resolution, when the Security Council, whose members are at times com-
plicit in grave international crimes, is unwilling or unable to act.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A close look at the most egregious examples of human rights viola-
tions in recent times reveals a common trend: most governments that
perpetrate these grave crimes do not act alone.1 They often have help
from other countries.2 The examples are numerous. During the Cold
War, the United States provided military aid, equipment, and training
to the Guatemalan government, despite the mounting evidence of
crimes against humanity and genocide reported by the Central Intelli-
gence Agency and U.S. Department of State.3 China continued to pro-
1. MILES JACKSON, COMPLICITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 221 (2015).
2. Id.
3. Through Freedom of Information Act requests, the National Security Archive ob-
tained numerous government documents that demonstrate the United States’
knowledge of numerous massacres and extrajudicial killings perpetrated by the
Guatemalan government. To view the Central Intelligence Agency and U.S. De-
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vide arms to the Sudanese government, even with the knowledge that
Sudan would likely use them to perpetrate atrocities in Darfur.4 Rus-
sia has continued to provide military support to the Assad regime in
Syria, despite its widely condemned air strikes in Aleppo and likely
use of chemical weapons against its own people.5 The United States,
the United Kingdom, and France have all provided logistical support
and intelligence to a Saudi-led coalition whose airstrikes have killed
numerous civilians.6 What legal responsibility do these supporting
countries bear for the crimes of their allies? Are there affirmative
norms in international law that require States to refrain from provid-
ing assistance to other States if they know that it will be used to com-
mit human rights abuses? Most critically, how do we punish State
accomplices that aid and abet other States in committing mass
atrocities?
This Article asserts that much like there is an emergent responsi-
bility to protect (R2P) the human rights of another country’s people
when that country is unable or unwilling to do so, States also have,
what I term, a duty to refrain (D2R) from assisting other States in
their commission of grave crimes. Essentially, if States have a duty to
act in order to prevent grave international crimes, then a fortiorari
they must also have a duty to refrain from assisting other countries in
committing grave international crimes that violate jus cogens norms.
partment of State cables, see Kate Doyle & Carlos Osorio, U.S. Policy in Guate-
mala, 1966–1996, THE NAT’L SECURITY ARCHIVE, http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/
NSAEBB/NSAEBB11/docs [https://perma.unl.edu/WZH7-V7HS]; see also Santi-
ago Wills, Did Reagan Finance Genocide in Guatemala?, ABC NEWS (May 14,
2013), http://abcnews.go.com/ABC_Univision/News/ronald-reagan-finance-geno
cide-guatemala/story?id=19179627 [https://perma.unl.edu/V5A9-WM4B] (ex-
plaining the United States’ involvement in the genocide in Guatemala between
1982 and 1983). U.S. President Bill Clinton has apologized for the United States’
role in these gross human rights violations, not only in Guatemala but also in
Rwanda and Greece. HELMUT PHILIPP AUST, COMPLICITY AND THE LAW OF STATE
RESPONSIBILITY 104 (2011).
4. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, NO END TO VIOLENCE IN DARFUR: ARMS SUPPLIES CON-
TINUE DESPITE ONGOING HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS (2012); Hilary Andersson,
China ‘Is Fuelling War in Darfur,’ BBC (July 13, 2008), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/
hi/africa/7503428.stm [https://perma.unl.edu/U386-4HTZ].
5. Syria Conflict: France Wants Russia on War Crimes Charges, BBC (Oct. 10,
2016), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-37611151 [https://perma.unl.edu/
MVK3-Y68Y]; Tillerson Draws Line in the Sand over Russia’s Support of Assad
Regime, ABC NEWS (Apr. 11, 2017), http://abcnews.go.com/International/tillerson
-assads-reign-syria-coming-end/story?id=46723724 [https://perma.unl.edu/HS24-
Y4CU].
6. Yemen Crisis: Who Is Fighting Who?, BBC (Jan. 30, 2018), http://www.bbc.com/
news/world-middle-east-29319423 [https://perma.unl.edu/4ZCF-ZQWD]; see also
Yemen Events of 2016, HUM. RIGHTS WATCH, (2017), https://www.hrw.org/world-
report/2017/country-chapters/yemen [https://perma.unl.edu/5EUF-63JJ] (“[A]s of
October 10, [2016,] at least 4,125 civilians had been killed and 7,207 wounded
since the start of the campaign . . . .”).
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While much scholarship has been devoted to R2P, it has barely
touched on D2R. Over the last couple of years, legal scholars have be-
come increasingly interested in the liability that attaches anytime a
State is complicit in the wrongful conduct of other States.7 However,
the scholarship has focused on the more general rule, which prohibits
States from assisting other States in acts that violate international
law.8 Yet, the scope of this rule is so broad that the contours of this
general responsibility are murky. Moreover, the level of generality of
the rule complicates its enforcement, a topic that has hardly been
touched in the emergent literature.
In this Article, I articulate a more specific and well-defined duty to
refrain from assisting in the violation of non-derogable jus cogens
norms, such as the universal prohibitions on crimes against human-
ity, war crimes, genocide, slavery, and torture. While others have ex-
plored individual complicity under international criminal law and
State responsibility for non-state actors, this Article focuses squarely
on State complicity in the grave crimes of other States.9 I urge legal
scholars and policymakers to turn their sights to D2R as an effective
complement to R2P.
This Article proceeds in six parts. In Part II, I define what D2R is
and what D2R is not. In Part III, I lay out all of the legal sources that
establish D2R as an emerging principle in international law. In Part
IV, I argue that scholars have too readily focused on R2P, while over-
looking the potential that a well-grounded D2R rule could have in
curbing mass atrocities. While intervention by other States or the Se-
curity Council can escalate conflict, requiring States to refrain from
assisting other State perpetrators decreases the resources at their dis-
posal to perpetuate violence. I further argue that D2R is a logical com-
7. In 2015, the American Society of International Law (ASIL) hosted a panel on
complicity under international law that touched on State complicity. For more
information on the ASIL panel, see R. Carter Pare´t, Complicity in International
Law, AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. (Apr. 10, 2015, 3:02 PM), https://www.asil.org/blogs/com-
plicity-international-law. The European Journal of International Law (EJIL)
hosted two online symposia in the last two years. See, e.g., Helen McDermott,
Book Discussion on Miles Jackson’s “Complicity in International Law,” EJIL:
TALK! (Apr. 11, 2017), https://www.ejiltalk.org/book-discussion-introducing-miles-
jacksons-complicity-in-international-law/ [https://perma.unl.edu/QB6H-Q9NS]
(highlighting the details of the discussion).
8. Int’l Law Comm’n, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally
Wrongful Acts, with Commentaries, art. 16, Rep. of the Int’l Law Comm’n on the
Work of Its Fifty-Third Session, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (2001) [hereinafter Draft
Articles].
9. Oona Hathaway and others explore the contours of State responsibility for aiding
and abetting non-state actors. Oona Hathaway et el., Ensuring Responsibility:
Common Article 1 and State Responsibility for Non-State Actors, 95 TEX. L. REV.
539 (2017); MARINA AKSENOVA, COMPLICITY IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW
(2016) (exploring the development of complicity as a theory of liability in interna-
tional criminal law).
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plement to R2P and explain how it overcomes some of the critiques
leveled at R2P. Part V identifies the various obstacles to enforcing the
general rule against State complicity in the wrongdoing of other
States and explores how a more narrowly tailored focus on D2R would
overcome some of these obstacles. Part VI proposes additional ways to
enhance enforcement of State complicity in grave crimes through bi-
lateral agreements and the sanctioning powers of the U.N. General
Assembly pursuant to the United for Peace Resolution. Part VII
concludes.
II. THE DUTY TO REFRAIN
A. Defining D2R
The need to address State complicity in grave crimes has increased
urgency in the modern era, as the cooperation between States in
armed conflict and counter-terrorism efforts becomes more common.10
As joint endeavors between States grow, so does the possibility that a
State will facilitate the grave crimes of other States through the provi-
sion of political, military, or economic aid. Indeed, in recent history,
there are many notable examples of international wrongdoing by
States carried out with the support of other States.11 This is not terri-
bly surprising. Most grave international crimes, particularly those in-
volving mass atrocities, require extensive planning, broad
coordination, and pooling of resources—such as weaponry and hench-
men—that often cross borders. At the same time, States have fre-
quently been reticent to put their own “boots on the ground”12 in crisis
situations. Consequently, States, reluctant to enmesh themselves in
messy armed conflicts, have incentives to facilitate the acts of other
States whose geopolitical interests align with their own. In some in-
stances, the commission of mass atrocities would not have been possi-
ble without this external support. This reality raises a broader
question: Should States be permitted to facilitate the commission of
grave crimes by assisting another State actor?
The International Law Commission (ILC) has concluded that one
should not be able to “do by another what [one] cannot do by [one-
10. HARRIET MOYNIHAN, AIDING AND ASSISTING: CHALLENGES IN ARMED CONFLICT AND
COUNTERTERRORISM 3 (2016); Brian Finucane, Partners and Legal Pitfalls, 92
INT’L L. STUD. 407, 430–31 (2016); Georg Nolte & Helmut Philipp Aust, Equivocal
Helpers—Complicit States, Mixed Messages, and International Law, 58 INT’L &
COMP. L.Q. 1, 1 (2009).
11. AUST, supra note 3, at 105.
12. See, e.g., Karoun Demirjian, Boots on the Ground in Syria Have Lawmakers Call-
ing for a New AUMF, WASH. POST (Nov. 1, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.
com/news/powerpost/wp/2015/11/01/boots-on-the-ground-in-syria-has-lawmakers
-calling-for-a-new-aumf/?utm_term=.c32e6140ec13 [https://perma.unl.edu/X2D2-
NUW4] (“Many lawmakers want to keep combat troops out of Syria at all costs.”).
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self].”13 Accordingly, as I will describe more fully below, the ILC has
outlined a general rule on State complicity in the Articles on Responsi-
bility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (ARSIWA).14 Com-
plicity, as it is commonly understood, is “an actor’s participation in
wrongdoing committed by another actor.”15 In criminal law, it is a
form of secondary participation, in which the accomplice does not di-
rectly perpetrate the crime, but rather, promotes or facilitates the
commission of a crime by planning, instigating, ordering, or aiding
and abetting.16 Similarly, State complicity occurs when a State facili-
tates another State’s commission of an internationally wrongful act,
but does not participate in the act itself.17 All of the rules on State
complicity form what legal scholar Helmut Philipp Aust has labeled “a
network of rules.”18
The D2R obligation that I propose is a subset of this broader rule
on State complicity and only addresses crimes that violate non-dero-
gable jus cogens norms. As defined by Article 53 of the Vienna Conven-
tion on the Law of Treaties, jus cogens norms—also called peremptory
norms—are those that are “accepted and recognized by the interna-
tional community of States as a whole as a norm from which no dero-
gation is permitted.”19 While the Vienna Convention does not
delineate which norms rise to the level of jus cogens norms, there is
general consensus that jus cogens norms include the prohibitions
against genocide, crimes against humanity, aggression, slavery, and
torture.20 These crimes violate jus cogens norms because they impli-
cate the common interests of the international community, threaten
peace and security of all humankind, and shock the conscience.21 Be-
cause of their gravity, States have a heightened duty to ensure that
they abide by jus cogens norms.22
D2R is a logical outgrowth of jus cogens norms. Under interna-
tional law, States may not legitimize—by consent, acquiescence, or
13. Draft Articles, supra note 8, art. 16, cmt. 6, at 66.
14. Id. art. 16.
15. JACKSON, supra note 1, at 10.
16. AKSENOVA, supra note 9, at 87–88.
17. John Quigley, Complicity in International Law: A New Direction in the Law of
State Responsibility, 57 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 78, 80 (1986).
18. AUST, supra note 3, at 376 (citation omitted).
19. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 53, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S.
331, 336 [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
20. JACKSON, supra note 1, at 173 (citing Eric Suy, Article 53—Treaties Conflicting
with a Peremptory Norm of General International Law (‘jus cogens’) in 2 THE VI-
ENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES: A COMMENTARY (Oliver Corten &
Pierre Klein eds., 2011)); Draft Articles, supra note 8, art. 40, cmt. 4, at 112;
VAUGHAN LOWE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 58–60 (2007).
21. M. Cherif Bassiouni, International Crimes: Jus Cogens and Obligatio Erga
Omnes, 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 63, 69 (1997).
22. AUST, supra note 3, at 319–20.
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recognition—any act that is contrary to jus cogens norms.23 By logical
extension, States should also not be permitted to aid other States in
their violations of jus cogens norms. Indeed, when jus cogens norms
are impacted, States have a heightened duty to refrain from acts that
facilitate their allies’ wrongdoing.24 Thus, actions that conflict with
D2R principles ought to be subject to stricter standards than the gen-
eral rule on State complicity provides. For example, since any treaty
that conflicts with a jus cogen norm is void by law, any foreign aid
agreement that facilitates another State’s violations of jus cogens
norms should be void.25 In addition, since statutes of limitations do
not apply to crimes that constitute violations of jus cogens norms,
there should similarly be no statute of limitations for violations of
D2R.26
As will be discussed in more detail in Part VI, a narrower focus on
D2R is also advantageous because it provides more paths to enforce-
ment than the general rule on State complicity. First, D2R broadens
the scope of situations where legal consequences can flow from State
complicity. Generally, in order for an injured State to invoke the re-
sponsibility for another State, the State wrongdoer must have
breached a binding legal obligation.27 In the case of State complicity,
there are two breaching States: the principal perpetrator State and
the assisting State.28 So for legal consequences to arise from a com-
plicit act, the injured State, the State perpetrator, and the complicit
State must all have been bound by the same legal obligation.29 State
complicity involving jus cogens violations are less likely to escape pun-
ishment because States do not need to consent to them in order to be
bound by them.30 All States are obligated not to be complicit in jus
cogens violations. In short, D2R violations are always illegal.
Second, D2R violations present greater opportunities for enforce-
ment because all States have a legal interest in enforcing them. This
is because jus cogens norms implicate obligations erga omnes.31 Obli-
23. OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW 7–8 (Robert Jennings & Arthur Watts eds.,
1992).
24. AUST, supra note 3, at 373.
25. Vienna Convention, supra note 19.
26. Bassiouni, supra note 21, at 65–66.
27. Draft Articles, supra note 8, art. 42; see also VLADYSLAV LANOVOY, COMPLICITY
AND ITS LIMITS IN THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 289 (2016) (ex-
plaining that a State’s responsibility for complicity ought to arise when the State
wrongdoer breaches an international obligation).
28. JACKSON, supra note 1, at 139 (“Responsibility arises for the complicit [S]tate only
where the principal [S]tate actually perpetrates an act of aggression against a
third [S]tate—without the principal’s wrongful act, there is nothing for the com-
plicit [S]tate to be complicit in.”).
29. LANOVOY, supra note 27, at 289.
30. JACKSON, supra note 1, at 162.
31. Id. at 73.
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gations erga omnes are those duties owed “to the international com-
munity as a whole” because they involve issues that concern all
States, such as the maintenance of peace and security, the protection
of human rights, and the preservation of the environment.32 Due to
the nature of these obligations, all States—even those unharmed by
the wrongful act—have an interest in upholding them and can invoke
the breach of an obligation erga omnes as a basis for various
countermeasures.33
These countermeasures could take a variety of forms. Institutional
enforcement is one possibility. For example, a serious breach of an ob-
ligation erga onmes could result in the suspension of a State Accom-
plice’s membership in an international organization.34 Individual
States are also permitted to take countermeasures acting alone. These
can include suspending trade, removing diplomatic privileges or expel-
ling certain diplomats from the offending State, freezing assets of the
offending State, or prohibiting use of airspace or landing rights.35
B. What D2R Is Not
Before we examine the many sources of law that evince the prohi-
bition on States from assisting other States in the commission of grave
crimes, it is important to set out what State complicity is not. State
complicity does not occur when States act jointly to commit an inter-
national wrong; separate rules of State responsibility govern these ac-
tions.36 So, for example, when Saudi Arabia and other countries
jointly participate in airstrikes that indiscriminately kill civilians in
Yemen, they are liable for civilian deaths, not because of D2R, but
because they directly participated in the acts. On the other hand, the
United States and the United Kingdom, two countries that provided
32. In dictum in the Barcelona Traction case, the ICJ made a distinction between the
obligations that States owe to the international community as a whole (obliga-
tions erga omnes) and those owed to a specific State because of a particular rela-
tionship with that State (often via a treaty or bilateral agreement) or other
circumstances involving that State. The ICJ explained that because of the impor-
tance of obligations erga omnes, “all States can be held to have a legal interest in
their protection.” Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co. (Belg. v. Spain), Second
Phase, 1970 I.C.J Rep. 3, 32, ¶ 33–34 (Feb. 5); see also Draft Articles, supra note
8, pt. II, ch. III, at ¶ 7 (explaining that a State’s obligations owed to “the interna-
tional community as a whole all concern obligations which, it is generally ac-
cepted, arise under peremptory norms of general international law” (internal
citation omitted)).
33. Id.; see LANOVOY, supra note 27, at 292.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 296.
36. Article 47 of the Draft Articles governs this conduct. JACKSON, supra note 1, at
170 (citing Draft Articles, supra note 8, art. 47, at 124; Vaughan Lowe, Responsi-
bility for the Conduct of Other States, JAPANESE J. INT’L L. 1, 10–11 (2002)).
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intelligence and logistical support to the Saudi-led coalition, might be
liable under D2R if they did so knowingly.
Nor is D2R in play when another actor commits crimes under the
direction or control of another State.37 Complicity is distinct from vi-
carious liability, in which a State is responsible because the wrongful
acts were committed by its agent.38 So, when Hezbollah—an organiza-
tion many believe to be a proxy for Iran—commits atrocities, Iran is
not responsible under D2R.39 Instead, these crimes implicate the doc-
trine of attribution, which requires that the assisting State exert such
a high level of influence that the State essentially controls the actor
that is responsible for the wrongdoing.40 States rarely exercise this
level of control over other States and even when they do, it is very
difficult to prove.
State complicity is different. Although State complicity derives
from the wrongdoing of the principal perpetrator, it is an independent,
separate wrong from the principal wrongful act.41 While complicit
State actors may not exercise direct control over the countries they
assist, their assistance facilitates the grave crimes of other State
perpetrators.42
III. THE SOURCES OF D2R
In the following sections, I set out the existing sources of interna-
tional law that establish D2R as a binding principle of international
37. Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Montenegro), Judgment, 2007 I.C.J. 43,¶ 419,
at 177–78 (Feb. 2007) [hereinafter Bosnian Genocide Case] (“[T]he question of
‘complicity’ is to be distinguished from the question, already considered and an-
swered in the negative, whether the perpetrators of the acts of genocide commit-
ted in Srebrenica acted on the instructions of or under the direction or effective
control of the organs of the FRY.”). Article 8 of the Draft Articles on State Respon-
sibility provides the following: “The conduct of a person or group of persons shall
be considered an act of a State under international law if the person or group of
persons is in fact acting on the instruction of, or under the control of, that State in
carrying out the conduct.” Draft Articles, supra note 8, art. 8, at 47.
38. Quigley, supra note 17, at 80.
39. See, e.g., Ben Hubbard, Iran Out to Remake Mideast with Arab Enforcer: Hezbol-
lah, N.Y. TIMES (August 17, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/27/world/
middleeast/hezbollah-iran-syria-israel-lebanon.html; Saleha Mohsin, U.S. Broad-
ens Sanctions Against Hezbollah, ‘Iran’s Primary Proxy’, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 2,
2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-02-02/u-s-broadens-sanc
tions-against-iran-s-primary-proxy-hezbollah [https://perma.unl.edu/VX7L-
SCBX].
40. Kate Nahapetian, Confronting State Complicity in International Law, 7 UCLA J.
INT’L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 99, 101 (2002).
41. Id. at 112.
42. Finucane, supra note 10, at 408 (“Although many external actors provide various
forms of assistance to groups inside Syria, few non-State actors could be consid-
ered to be under the ‘effective control’ of their benefactors.”).
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law. As a general rule, international law can be created through trea-
ties, customary international law, general principles of international
law, or judicial decisions and the writings of “the most highly qualified
publicists.”43 Binding customary international law is evidenced by “a
general and consistent practice of [S]tates followed by them from a
sense of legal obligation,” sometimes referred to as opinio juris for its
Latin name.44 As the U.S. Supreme Court explained in Paquete Ha-
bana, customary international law is established by “the common con-
sent of civilized communities,” which is enforceable because “it has
been generally accepted as a rule of conduct.”45
While customary international law and treaties are distinct
sources of international law, they are “complexly interrelated.”46
Treaties can either codify existing customary international law or cre-
ate new binding rules of customary law.47 At times, a network of trea-
ties, particularly multilateral treaties coupled with general State
practice that is consistent with these treaties, can form the basis of
binding customary international law that applies to States even if
they are not party to those treaties.48
Evidence for D2R can be found in multiple sources of international
law. Based on its analysis of State practice, the ILC has determined
that there is a general prohibition against States assisting other
States in “internationally wrongful acts.”49 The International Court of
Justice (ICJ) has concluded that this rule on State complicity is part of
binding customary international law.50 A close look at State practice
also evinces a more specific prohibition against State complicity in
acts that violate jus cogens norms.
A series of treaties, such as the Genocide Convention and the Arms
Trade Treaty, have further codified this more specific D2R principle.
Various interpretative bodies have read treaties that address jus
cogens violations together with the general customary rule on State
complicity articulated by the ILC in Article 16. For example, the ICJ
43. See Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38(1), June 26, 1945, 59
Stat. 1031, 33 U.N.T.S. 993.
44. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES,
§ 102 (1987).
45. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 711 (1900).
46. PHILIP ALSTON & RYAN GOODMAN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 74 (2013). For
example, even though the United States is not a signatory to the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), U.S. courts have held that it is
binding on the United States because it amounts to customary international law.
United States v. Jho, 534 F.3d 398, 406 (5th Cir. 2008); see also United States v.
Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., 11 F. Supp. 2d 1358, 1372 (S.D. Fla. 1998) (find-
ing that UNCLOS is properly considered customary international law).
47. Id.
48. Id. at 75.
49. Draft Articles, supra note 8, cmt. 1, at 31.
50. Bosnian Genocide Case, supra note 37, at ¶ 420.
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has held that the Genocide Convention codified the customary rule on
State complicity articulated by the ILC, with respect to the crime of
genocide.51 The U.K. Parliament’s Joint Committee on Human Rights,
in a report on alleged U.K. complicity in torture, drew from Article 16
and the Convention against Torture when defining State complicity in
torture.52 In El Masri v. Macedonia, Al Nashiri v. Poland, and Husayn
v. Poland, the European Court of Human Rights referenced the gen-
eral rule on State complicity, codified in Article 16, as relevant inter-
national law when it found that the respondent States violated the
prohibition on torture in the European Convention on Human Rights
by transferring the petitioners to the custody of the United States, de-
spite the existence of a real risk that they would be tortured.53
A. The ILC’s Draft Articles on State Responsibility
 The general rule on State complicity is a rather recent development
in international law. In the 2001 ARSIWA, the ILC—the primary in-
terpretive body of international law norms—outlined a set of general
rules that identified “which acts are [S]tate acts, what consequences
arise from the breach of an international obligation, and when the
wrongfulness of an act may be precluded.”54 The ARSIWA is not
equivalent to treaty law, but it gives States a sense of the rules that
may amount to customary international law, which is binding on
States.55 In a way, the ARSIWA is akin to the Model Penal Code,
which documents general practice and is an inspiration for criminal
codes enacted by States across the United States, even though it, in
itself, is not binding law.
Over the past century, the ILC has done a rather dramatic about-
face on State Accomplice liability, moving from complete rejection to
enthusiastic endorsement. Initially, in his Hague Lectures of 1939,
51. Id.
52. Jackson, supra note 1, at 152 (quoting Joint Committee on Human Rights, Alle-
gations of U.K. Complicity in Torture, 2008–09, H.L. 152, H.C. 230 (U.K.)).
53. El Masri v. the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, App. No. 39630/09, Eur.
Ct. H.R. (Dec. 13, 2012); Al Nashiri v. Poland, App. No. 28761/11, Eur. Ct. H.R.
(July 24, 2014); Husayn (Abu Zubaydah) v. Poland, App. No. 7511/13, Eur. Ct.
H.R. (July 24, 2014).
54. See JACKSON, supra note 1, at 147 (“Chapter IV ARISWA, which concerns the
responsibility of [S]tates in connection with the actions of another [S]tate, in-
cludes Article 16. Article 16 sets out a rule that prohibits [S]tates from aiding or
assisting another [S]tate in the commission of an internationally wrongful act.”
(citation omitted)). The ILC plays a role in both articulating what constitutes
international customary law and influencing its development. Nahapetian, supra
note 40, at 101; Shana Tabak, Ambivalent Enforcement: International Humanita-
rian Law at Human Rights Tribunals, 37 MICH. J. INT’L L. 661, 674 (2016)
(describing the ILC as the “the primary interpretive body of international law
norms”).
55. Nahapetian, supra note 40, at 101.
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ILC founder Roberto Ago rejected the notion of State complicity, argu-
ing that:
[I]t appears inconceivable in international law to have any form of complicity,
participation, or incitement to a delict. The law of nations, in its current struc-
ture, does not allow for such forms of a consideration shared by several sub-
jects with respect to a single delict; these constructs are characteristic of the
nature and development of domestic criminal law.56
However, persuaded by the growing condemnation of State accom-
plices, the ILC later embraced a customary rule on State complicity.
In 1970, in a dramatic departure from his original stance, Roberto Ago
laid out the conceptual framework in his second report to the ILC.
There he conceived of State complicity as a secondary rule that only
came into play once a primary rule had been breached.57 In other
words, assisting States could only be complicit if the underlying act of
the principal State was illegal.58 By 1978, in its report to the U.N.
General Assembly, the ILC asserted that “the idea of participation in
the internationally wrongful act of another by providing ‘aid or assis-
tance’—and thus, in this sense, of ‘complicity’—has now gained ac-
ceptance in international law.”59 Later, in its 1996 report to the U.N.
General Assembly, the ILC stated that the duty to refrain from assist-
ing other States in the commission of wrongful acts was “an already
well-established practice.”60 Scholar Miles Jackson described this as
“a radical leap in the morality of international law.”61
Thus, after 50 years of deliberation on the subject, when the ILC
released ARSIWA in 2001, it included Article 16, a provision meant to
address State complicity in the wrongdoing of other States.62 Article
16 specified the following:
A State which aids and assists another State in the commission of an interna-
tionally wrongful act by the latter is internationally responsible for doing so if:
56. JACKSON, supra note 1 (quoting Roberto Ago, 68 Le De´lit International, (II)
RECUEIL DES COURS 419, 523 (1939) (translated)).
57. Id. at 148.
58. Id. at 139 (“Responsibility arises for the complicit [S]tate only where the principal
[S]tate actually perpetrates an act of aggression against a third [S]tate —without
the principal’s wrongful act, there is nothing for the complicit [S]tate to be com-
plicit in.”).
59. Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of its Thirtieth Session, Supp. No. 10, U.N.
Doc. A/33/10 (1979), reprinted in [1978] Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 74, 103, at para. 15,
U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1978/Add.1, Part 2 [hereinafter Thirty-Third Session
ILC Report].
60. Int’l Law Comm’n Rep. on the Work of its Forty-Eighth Session,  Supp. No. 10, at
39, para. 3, U.N. Doc. A/51/10 (1996) [hereinafter Forty-Eighth Session ILC
Report].
61. JACKSON, supra note 1, at 135.
62. Draft Articles, supra note 8, art. 16, at 65; JACKSON, supra note 1, at 147 (citation
omitted). The Draft Articles “are considered by courts and commentators to be in
whole or in large part an accurate codification of the customary international law
of [S]tate responsibility.” JAMES CRAWFORD, STATE RESPONSIBILITY: THE GENERAL
PART 43 (2013).
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a) that State does so with knowledge of the circumstances of the international
wrongful act; and
b) that act would be internationally wrongful if committed by that State.63
The Commentary to Article 16 in the Draft Articles sets out three
elements that must be shown to establish State complicity:
First, the relevant State organ or agency providing aid or assistance must be
aware of the circumstances making the conduct of the assisted State interna-
tionally wrongful; secondly, the aid or assistance must be given with a view to
facilitating the commission of that act, and must actually do so; and thirdly,
the completed act must be such that it would have been wrongful had it been
committed by the assisting State itself.64
As reflected in the Commentary, State complicity is by its nature
derivative.65 In other words, assisting another State in its activities is
not illegal unless the conduct of the principal State actor is wrongful.
Still, an assisting State is not responsible for the wrongdoing of the
principal State actor; rather it is responsible for the separate crime of
State complicity.66 Simply put, the wrongful acts of the principal State
actor are not imputed to complicit States as they would be under the
doctrine of attribution.67 Instead, an assisting State is only liable for
the harm that resulted from its own acts.
In this way, State complicity is distinct from individual criminal
liability in many common law jurisdictions, where the acts of the prin-
cipal actor are imputed to the accomplice. For example, in the United
States, 18 U.S.C. § 2 makes an accomplice punishable as a principal.
In the American Law Institute’s Model Penal Code, Section 2.06 pro-
vides that an accomplice “is legally accountable for the conduct of an-
other person . . . .”68 In England and Wales, the Accessories and
Abettors Act provides that accomplices can be indicted, tried, and pun-
ished as if they are the main perpetrators of the crime.69
In contrast to the criminal law in these national jurisdictions, the
ILC, in the Commentary to the Draft Articles, specified that “the as-
sisting State [will] only be responsible to the extent that its own con-
duct has caused or contributed to the internationally wrongful act.”70
This conduct does not need to be “essential” to the commission of the
wrongful act; rather, a State will be responsible if it “contributed sig-
nificantly to that act.”71 Yet, to be culpable, Article 16 requires that
the assisting State must have knowledge “of the circumstances of the
63. Draft Articles, supra note 8, art. 16, at 65.
64. Id. art. 16, cmt. 3, at 66.
65. JACKSON, supra note 1, at 5.
66. Id. at 3–4.
67. Id. at 7.
68. For a more in-depth description of differentiation between the principal and ac-
complice in criminal law, see id. at 23–24.
69. Id. at 23.
70. Draft Articles, supra note 8, art. 16 cmt. 1, at 66.
71. Id. art. 16, cmt. 5, at 66.
2018] THE DUTY TO REFRAIN 133
internationally wrongful act.”72 The Commentary to Article 16 gives
the example of “knowingly providing an essential facility or financing
the activity in question.”73
This general duty has gained prominence in international law. Cit-
ing consistent State practice, the ILC has concluded that State respon-
sibility for complicity in the wrongful acts of other States is part of
customary international law.74 In the Bosnian Genocide Case of 2007,
the International Court of Justice (ICJ) affirmed that Article 16 rises
to the level of customary international law, which is binding.75 Simi-
larly, in a case involving alleged German complicity in the United
States’ luring of a Yemeni man to Germany for the purposes of extra-
dition, the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany also applied Arti-
cle 16 because it concluded that it codified customary international
law.76 Furthermore, although the U.N. General Assembly has not for-
mally adopted the ILC’s Draft Articles, it has consistently commended
them year after year.77
The existence of a general rule on State complicity in internation-
ally wrongful acts does not preclude the more specific principle that
D2R represents. As Miles Jackson notes in his seminal book on State
complicity, the general rule naturally will come to be supplemented by
other more specific rules on State complicity, particularly those that
address issues of grave concern like breaches of peremptory, non-dero-
gable norms of international law.78 In addition, a more specific rule on
State complicity does not need to be the mirror image of the general
rule. Pursuant to lex specialis derogat legi generali, a legal doctrine
that provides that if two laws govern the same factual situation, a law
specifically tailored to the subject matter in question (lex specialis)
overrides a general law (lex generalis).79 Typically, a more specific
72. Id. art. 16, cmt. 4.
73. Id. art. 16, cmt. 1.
74. Thirty-Third Session ILC Report, supra note 59, art. 27, cmt. 15, at 103.
75. Bosnian Genocide Case, supra note 37, ¶ 420, at 178. For a discussion of the
Bosnian Genocide case, see Nolte & Aust, supra note 10, at 7.
76. The court held that because the underlying act of luring the man to Germany was
not wrongful, Germany was not complicit in the commission of a crime. JACKSON,
supra note 1, at 151.
77. MOYNIHAN, supra note 10, at 6 (“The UN General Assembly’s Sixth Committee
has established a Working Group on the Responsibility of States for Internation-
ally Wrongful Acts to consider further the question of whether the Articles on
State Responsibility should be turned into a Convention.” (citing G.A. Res. 68/
104, On the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (Dec. 16,
2013))).
78. JACKSON, supra note 1, at 172–73 (“New rules might arise, imposing stricter stan-
dards on [S]tates in respect of matters of particularly grave concern.”).
79. Int’l Law Comm’n, Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from
the Diversification and Expansion of International Law, ¶ 5, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/
L.682 (Apr. 13, 2006) (“The maxim lex specialis derogat legi generali is a gener-
ally accepted technique of interpretation and conflict resolution in international
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rule on D2R would trump the general rule on State complicity. Thus,
the general rule could be used as a guide or reference point for emerg-
ing rules, which could impose stricter standards, particularly when it
involves grave breaches of international law.80
For example, when the “internationally wrongful act” in question
amounts to a violation of a jus cogens norm, a stricter mens rea could
be warranted. The ILC has eluded to as much when in its Commen-
tary to Article 16, it specified:
Where the allegation is that the assistance of a State has facilitated human
rights abuses by another State, the particular circumstances of each case
must be carefully examined to determine whether the aiding State by its aid
was aware of and intended to facilitate the commission of the internationally
wrongful conduct.”81
This mention of intent is notable since a similar mens rea require-
ment, while present in the first Draft Articles, was eliminated in its
existing formulation.82 As noted above, the current general rule on
State complicity only requires knowledge “of the circumstances of the
internationally wrongful act.”83 So, arguably, this reference to intent
in the context of human rights violations implies that when a State
intends to facilitate violations of human rights, then it is more culpa-
ble than a State who does so incidentally.
B. What Does State Practice Tell Us?
As explained above, in order for a rule of customary international
law to exist, there must be evidence of general, constant, and uniform
State practice and a widespread belief among States (opinio juris) that
the rule amounts to customary international law.84 Much of the evi-
dence used to support a finding of a general prohibition on State com-
plicity in international wrongdoing also supports the finding of a more
specific rule concerning D2R. As a number of scholars, including Aust,
have observed, the State practice cited by the ILC to establish a rule
on State responsibility for complicity mostly addresses violations of
jus cogens norms.85 Miles Jackson too pointed out that much of the
evidence of State practice used to support the prohibition against
State complicity in internationally wrongful acts involves a fairly lim-
ited number of international wrongs, specifically the crime of aggres-
law. It suggests that whenever two or more norms deal with the same subject
matter, priority should be given to the norm that is more specific.”)
80. JACKSON, supra note 1, at 172.
81. Draft Articles, supra note 8, art. 16, cmt. 9, at 67.
82. Nahapetian, supra note 40, at 106–07.
83. Draft Articles, supra note 8, art. 16, at 65.
84. JAMES CRAWFORD, BROWNLIE’S PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2012).
85. AUST, supra note 3, at 190.
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sion, human rights violations, and the evasion of Security Council
sanctions.86
A close examination of State practice evinced by the ILC to estab-
lish a binding rule on State complicity supports the claims of these
scholars. The most recent iteration of the ARISWA relies entirely on
case studies that involve violations of jus cogens norms. Specifically, in
support of its finding that persistent State practice pointed to a prohi-
bition on State complicity in international crimes, the ILC relied on
cases involving crimes that violate jus cogens norms, namely, the
crime of aggression and crimes against humanity. First, the ILC high-
lighted a complaint that Iran lodged against the United Kingdom in
1984 for supplying Iraq with chemical weapons, which Iraq allegedly
used against Iranian troops.87 Iran characterized the United King-
dom’s provision of these weapons as an act of aggression.88 Although
the United Kingdom denied the charge, the United States issued a
public rebuke of Iraq.89 After a U.N. inspection team concluded that
Iraq had used chemical weapons against Iran, the United States and
several European States halted the sale of the substances used to
make these chemical weapons to Iraq.90 Second, the ILC cited a simi-
lar situation in 1998 involving Sudan, which was accused of allowing
Iraqis to use Sudanese installations to produce nerve gas.91 That year,
the U.S. government bombed a Sudanese installation based on its be-
lief that Iraq was using the factory to produce the nerve agent VX.92
The ILC also relied on U.N. General Assembly resolutions asking U.N.
Member States to refrain from supplying arms and other assistance to
countries with questionable human rights records.93
Furthermore, when the ILC stated that the general rule in Article
16 prohibited States from permitting other States to use their terri-
tory to violate the international rules on the use of force, all of the
examples that the ILC used to justify this proposition involved the
crime of aggression.94 For instance, the ILC relied on a statement
from West Germany explaining its rationale for allowing the United
86. JACKSON, supra note 1, at 15.
87. Draft Articles, supra note 8, art. 16, cmt. 7, at 66.
88. Id.
89. Id.; Bernard Gwertzman, U.S. Says Iraqis Used Poison Gas Against Iranians in
Latest Battles, N.Y. TIMES (March 6, 1984), http://www.nytimes.com/1984/03/06/
world/us-says-iraqis-used-poison-gas-against-iranians-in-latest-battles.html.
90. Quigley, supra note 38, at 91 (citation omitted).
91. Id. (citing Jane Perlez, After the Attacks: The Connection; Iraqi Deal with Sudan
on Nerve Gas Is Reported, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 26, 1998), http://www.nytimes.com/
1998/08/26/world/after-the-attacks-the-connection-iraqi-deal-with-sudan-on-ner
ve-gas-is-reported.html).
92. Perlez, supra note 91.
93. Draft Articles, supra note 8, art. 16, cmt. 9, at 67.
94. Id. art. 16 cmt. 8, at 66–67.
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States to use its airfields to attack Lebanon.95 While the Soviet Union
claimed that this assent amounted to an act of aggression, West Ger-
many defended its actions by claiming that the United States was act-
ing in self-defense, which is permitted under the international rules
on the use of force.96 According to the ILC, this defense implied that
West Germany believed that if it had assisted the United States in the
commission of an act of aggression, it would have constituted a sepa-
rate violation in itself.97
A number of other international institutions have also referenced
D2R principles. The U.N. General Assembly has invoked the duty to
refrain from assisting other countries in committing human rights vio-
lations in several resolutions.98 For instance, the General Assembly
urged governments “to refrain from supplying arms and other military
assistance as long as serious human rights violations in Guatemala
continue to be reported.”99 Similarly, the Assembly called on States
“to refrain from the supply of arms and other military assistance” to
El Salvador because of reports of serious human rights violations oc-
curring there.100
After 9/11, a number of European institutions also issued opinions
that reflected D2R principles when addressing the coordination
among States to facilitate the detention of individuals in secret sites
and the extraordinary rendition of these detainees to countries where
they would likely be subjected to torture.101 When reports emerged
that some European States assisted the United States in these ef-
forts—by granting overflight rights, the provision of secret detention
centers, and exchanging intelligence—the Parliamentary Assembly of
the Council of Europe and the European Parliament of the European
Union issued statements regarding those practices.102
95. Id.
96. Nahapetian, supra note 40, at 103.
97. Id.
98. Marko Divac O¨berg, The Legal Effects of Resolutions of the UN Security Council
and General Assembly in the Jurisprudence of the ICJ, 16 Eur. J. Int’l. L. 879,
(2006) (citing Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Ni-
car. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. Rep 14, at 103, para. 195 (June 27) [hereinaf-
ter Nicaragua Case] (stating that a G.A. resolution “may be taken to reflect
customary international law”)).
99. GA Res. A/37/745 XVII, at 17 (Dec. 14, 1982).
100. Situation of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms in EI Salvador, 15 De-
cember 1980, Draft Res. IX. The vote was 70–12–55.
101. Extraordinary rendition is “a process by which a detainee is transferred into an-
other State’s custody outside regular legal proceedings and with the prospect of
being subjected to torture or at least cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment.”
AUST, supra note 3, at 120 (citing Council of Europe, Venice Commission, Opinion
on the International Legal Obligations of Council of Europe Member States in
Respect of Secret Detention Facilities and Inter-State Transport of Prisoners,
Opinion No. 363/2005 (March 17, 2006) [hereinafter Venice Commission]).
102. AUST, supra note 3, at 120.
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The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe issued a res-
olution urging States to ensure that “all international co-operation
and mutual legal assistance is carried out only in circumstances that
respect human rights and international conventions in the field.”103
In its opinion regarding the legal obligations of State parties of the
Council of Europe concerning the U.S. Rendition Program, the Euro-
pean Commission for Democracy through Law concluded that, pursu-
ant to ILC Draft Article 16, providing “transit facilities to another
State may amount to providing assistance to the latter in committing
a wrongful act, if the former State is aware of the wrongful character
of the act concerned.”104 In his report, the Secretary General of the
Council of Europe added that:
In accordance with the generally recognised rules on State responsibility,
States may be held responsible for aiding or assisting another State in the
commission of an internationally wrongful act. There can be little doubt that
aid or assistance by agents of a State party in the commission of human rights
abuses by agents of another State acting within the former’s jurisdiction
would constitute a violation of the [European] Convention [on Human
Rights].105
Similarly, drawing from both Article 16 and the Convention
against Torture, in a report evaluating the United Kingdom’s alleged
complicity in torture, the U.K. Parliament’s Joint Committee on
Human Rights defined State complicity in torture as follows:
[F]or the purposes of State responsibility for complicity in torture . . .  complic-
ity means simply one State giving assistance to another State in the commis-
sion of torture, or acquiescing in such torture, in the knowledge, including
constructive knowledge, of the circumstances of the torture which is or has
been taking place.106
Also, in a 2009 report, the Special Rapporteur on human rights and
terrorism underscored the relevance of Article 16 when States con-
sider whether to cooperate in rendition, detention, or interrogation.107
The practices of individual States also support the existence of
D2R. For instance, in 1974, the U.S. Congress passed a law that pro-
hibited the U.S. government from giving military aid to “any country
the government of which engages in a consistent pattern of gross vio-
103. Id. at 121 (quoting Eur. Parl. Ass. Res. 1507, Alleged Secret Detentions and Un-
lawful Inter-State Transfers of Detainees Involving Council of Europe Member
States (June 27, 2006), at ¶ 19.4.).
104. Venice Commission, supra note 101, ¶ 45, at 11.
105. Council of Europe, ‘Report of the Secretary General on the Use of His Powers
under Article 52 of the European Convention on Human Rights,’ SG/Inf (2006), at
5, para. 23.
106. Jackson, supra note 1, at 152 (quoting Joint Committee on Human Rights, Alle-
gations of UK Complicity in Torture, 2008–09, H.L. 152, H.C. 230 (U.K.)).
107. Id. (quoting Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Human
Rights, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms While Countering Terrorism, U.N.
Doc. A/HRC/10/3 (Feb. 4, 2009)).
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lations of internationally recognized human rights” except under ex-
traordinary circumstances.108 In line with this legislation, the United
States has stopped the sale of arms to Israel, a close ally of the United
States, when it suspected that Israel was involved in gross violations
of human rights. Specifically, after learning that Israel used U.S.-sup-
plied cluster bombs in Lebanon, which resulted in injury to civilians,
the United States stopped all shipment of the bombs to Israel while it
investigated Israel’s use of them.109 That same legislation also re-
quires the United States to terminate economic (non-military) aid to
States that violate human rights.110
Other States have taken a similar approach of suspending foreign
aid as a means to pressure other countries to stop violating human
rights. For example, a number of States terminated foreign aid to
Chile in 1973, citing human rights violations. As a U.N. commission
reported:
[T]he vast majority of the States which have commented on their behaviour
vis-a`-vis Chile in the field of economic relations after 11 September 1973, have
pointed out that they have either refused or substantially decreased their eco-
nomic assistance to Chile, as a direct consequence of the suppression of civil
and political rights in that country carried out by the present authorities.
Thus, the introduction of a repressive system in Chile has resulted in a vast
segment of the international community denying economic aid to Chile, with a
view to bringing pressure to bear on the present Chilean authorities for a res-
toration of human rights in that country.111
In other cases, governments have established investigatory bodies
to determine whether other States were complicit in jus cogens viola-
tions.112 For example, the Rwandan government suspected the in-
volvement of French military advisors who were present in Rwanda in
the genocide in 1994 and so established an investigatory commission
in order to investigate whether France was complicit in the
genocide.113
Some State actors have acknowledged and expressed remorse for
their complicity in the grave crimes of other States. For example, U.S.
President Bill Clinton apologized for the U.S. government’s complicity
108. 22 U.S.C. § 2304(a), cmt. 2 (2012).
109. Quigley, supra note 38, at 91.
110. 22 U.S.C. § 2304(c), cmt. 4(A) (2012).
111. Study of the Impact of Foreign Economic Aid and Assistance on Respect for
Human Rights in Chile, 31 Sub-Comm’n on Prevention of Discrimination and
Protection of Minorities, para. 419, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.z/412 (1978). On the
1973 Chile aid cut-offs, see generally Antonio Cassese, Foreign Economic Assis-
tance and Respect for Civil and Political Rights: Chile-A Case Study, 50 TEX.
INT’L L.J. 647, 648–52 (2016).
112. Nolte & Aust, supra note 10, at 9–10.
113. Id. at 9 (quoting Philippe Bernard, Le Rwanda publie son requisitoire contre la
France, LE MONDE (Aug. 6, 2008)).
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in gross human rights violations in Guatemala, Rwanda, and
Greece.114
Finally, in recent times, a number of States have openly articu-
lated D2R principles with regard to Russia’s support of the Assad re-
gime. Specifically, the United States, United Kingdom, and France
have all condemned Russia’s complicity in the war crimes perpetrated
by Assad in Syria.115
C. More Specific Rule for Accessories After the Fact
Further evidence of D2R is the ILC’s finding of a special rule for
accessories after the fact, which applies once a serious breach of a jus
cogens norm occurs. This rule, stipulated in Article 41(2), provides
that “[n]o [S]tate shall recognize as lawful a situation created by a
serious breach within the meaning of Article 40, nor render aid or as-
sistance in maintaining that situation.”116 Article 40 limits the appli-
cation of Article 41(2) to “serious breaches of obligations under
peremptory norms of general international law.”117 A serious breach
of a peremptory norm is defined as a breach involving “a gross or sys-
tematic failure by the responsible State to fulfill its obligations.”118
Unlike Article 16, these Articles do not require that the responsible
State know about the serious breach in order to be held responsible.119
In this sense, Article 41 provides strict liability for complicity in jus
cogens violations.
The legal consequences that flow from a breach of Article 41 are
also distinct from a breach of Article 16. In its Commentary to Article
41, the ILC specified that States have “a duty of abstention” comprised
of two obligations: (1) the obligation of non-recognition of a situation
resulting from “serious breaches of obligations under peremptory
norms of general international law,” and (2) the obligation “not to
114. AUST, supra note 3, at 104.
115. Syria Conflict: France Wants Russia on War Crimes Charges, BBC (Oct. 10,
2016), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-37611151; J.J. Gallagher & Vero-
nica Stracqualursi, Tillerson Draws Line in the Sand over Russia’s Support of
Assad Regime, ABC NEWS (Apr. 11, 2017), http://abcnews.go.com/International/
tillerson-assads-reign-syria-coming-end/story?id=46723724; UK Minister Con-
demns Russia for “Giving Green Flag” to Assad, EU TODAY (Apr. 28, 2018), https:/
/eutoday.net/news/human-rights/2018/uk-minister-condemns-russia-for-giving-
green-flag-to-assad.
116. Draft Articles, supra note 8, art. 41(2), at 114.
117. Draft Articles, supra note 8, art. 40, at 113; see also JACKSON, supra note 1, at 173
(“The second clause of Article 41(2) supplements the prohibition on aid and assis-
tance in Article 16, dealing ‘with conduct “after the fact” which assists the respon-
sible [S]tate in maintaining’ the situation created by the breach.” (citation
omitted)).
118. Draft Articles, supra note 8, art. 40, at 113.
119. MOYNIHAN, supra note 10, at 23 (citing AUST, supra note 3, at 422).
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render aid or assistance in maintaining that situation.”120 Addition-
ally, all States are under a positive obligation to cooperate in bringing
to an end the serious breach.121 The divergence in legal consequences
is likely a reflection of the narrower application of Article 41 to only
the most egregious violations of international law. Also, because a
breach of Article 41 is not speculative (it has already occurred), States
have a higher burden to ensure that its support is not being used to
aggravate or maintain an illegal situation.
D2R goes further than Article 41 in that it also applies to situa-
tions where serious breaches have yet to occur. Still, Article 41 is evi-
dence that a narrower rule on State complicity in grave crimes is
justified under international law. Article 41 can also inform how we
shape the contours of D2R, particularly with regards to devising the
appropriate mens rea requirement.
D. D2R in Multilateral Treaties
There are also numerous international treaties that explicitly and
implicitly prohibit State complicity in grave international crimes. In-
ternational treaties which obligate State parties to uphold or protect
human rights include an implicit obligation not to engage in acts that
facilitate the commission of human rights violations, particularly
those that concern fundamental rights like the right to life. The law of
treaties—codified in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties—
provides as much, by obligating State parties to a treaty “to refrain
from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of a treaty.”122
So, for example, treaties such as the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights (ICCRP), whose object and purpose is to realize
“the inherent dignity and . . . equal and inalienable rights of all mem-
bers of the human family,” require State parties not to engage in acts
that undermine the human rights of all people. In short, the negative
obligation to refrain from acts that facilitate human rights violations
flow from the positive obligation to protect them.
Other treaties expressly prohibit assistance to other States who
engage in acts that will violate human rights and humanitarian law.
For example, pursuant to Article 1(c) of the Convention on the Prohi-
bition, Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel
Mines and on their Destruction, State parties may not “assist, en-
courage or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in any activity pro-
hibited to a State party under this Convention.”123 Such activities
120. Draft Articles, supra note 8, art. 41, cmts. 4–6, at 114.
121. Id. art. 41(1), at 113.
122. Vienna Convention, supra note 19, art. 18.
123. Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of
Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction art. 1(c), Sept. 18, 1997, 2056
U.N.T.S. 211, 242.
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include the use or stockpiling of anti-personnel mines, which violate
humanitarian law because they do not distinguish between civilians
and combatants.124 In short, State parties cannot help other States,
even those not bound by the treaty, to use or retain anti-personnel
mines.
The Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) also prohibits the transfer of arms
where a State knows that they will be used by the receiving State to
commit genocide, crimes against humanity, grave breaches of the Ge-
neva Conventions, or war crimes.125 Additionally, Article 7 of the ATT
requires a State party to assess whether the arms that it plans to ex-
port could be used to commit or facilitate serious violations of human
rights or international humanitarian law and if so, to “consider
whether there are measures that could be undertaken to mitigate
risks.”126 If there is an “overriding risk” that the arms might be used
to commit a serious violation of international humanitarian law, then
a State should not export arms to them.127
Like the ATT, the Geneva Conventions prohibit State complicity in
grave violations of humanitarian law. Article 1, the so-called “nucleus
for a system of collective responsibility” and common to all the Geneva
Conventions, requires State parties to “respect and to ensure respect”
for the Convention “in all circumstances.”128 In addition to the posi-
tive obligation to prevent other States from violating international hu-
manitarian law codified in the Geneva Conventions, Article 1 implies
a negative obligation on State parties not to encourage, nor aid or as-
sist, in these violations.129 As a recent commentary from the Interna-
tional Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) explained:
The duty to ensure respect for the Geneva Conventions is particularly strong
in the case of a partner in a joint operation . . . . The fact, for example, that a
High Contracting Party participates in the financing, equipping, arming or
training of the armed forces of a Party to a conflict, or even plans, carries out
and debriefs operations jointly with such forces, places it in a unique position
124. Id. at Preamble, art. 1(a)–(b).
125. MOYNIHAN, supra note 10, at 28 (citing Arms Trade Treaty art. 6(3), Apr. 2, 2013,
U.N. Doc. A/Conf.217/2013/L.3 [hereinafter ATT] (stating that a State should not
export arms to another country “if it has knowledge at the time of authorization
that the arms or items would be used in the commission of genocide, crimes
against humanity, grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, attacks
directed against civilian objects or civilians protected as such, or other war crimes
as defined by international agreements to which it is a Party.”)).
126. ATT, supra note 125, art. 7.
127. Id.
128. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 1, Aug. 12,
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; AUST, supra note 3, at 385.
129. MOYNIHAN, supra note 10, at 26 (citing International Committee of the Red Cross
(ICRC), Commentary on the First Geneva Convention, art. 1, ¶ 154 (2d ed. Mar.
22, 2016), https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/ihl/full/GCI-commentary [https://
perma.unl.edu/C9KC-ZPQL] [hereinafter Commentary to the First Geneva
Convention]).
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to influence the behaviour of those forces, and thus to ensure respect for the
Conventions.130
While it is debatable whether this imposes a duty or even a right to
take countermeasures against States that violate the Geneva Conven-
tions, at the very least, it mandates States not to render aid to those
that do.131 Arguably, Article 1 also requires State parties to be more
vigilant that their assistance is not likely to be used in future viola-
tions of the Geneva Conventions.132
A number of actors have come to that conclusion. In a response to
parliamentary questions about the possibility that Dutch intelligence
had been used to facilitate U.S. drone strikes, the Dutch government
affirmed that, pursuant to Article 1, “when the Government knows
that a partner is using or will use intelligence that has been shared by
the Netherlands to commit a violation of international law and/or
IHL, the question whether such intelligence is shared will have to be
reconsidered.”133 Similarly, after concluding that Israel violated the
Geneva Conventions by annexing and colonizing territory in Palestine
and other Arab territories, the U.N. Human Rights Commission asked
“all States, in particular the State parties to the Geneva Convention
relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, in accor-
dance with [A]rticle 1 of that Convention . . . .” to refrain from “ex-
tending any aid which might be used by Israel in its pursuit of the
policies of annexation and colonization . . . .”134
According to Theodor Meron, who served as a judge for the Inter-
national Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and is now the
President of the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal
Tribunals:
The erga omnes character of many of the norms in these Conventions implies
that third [S]tates have not only the right to make appropriate representa-
tions urging respect for these norms to [S]tates allegedly involved in violating
them, but also a duty not to encourage others to violate the norms, and, per-
haps, even to discourage others from violating them.135
The Genocide Convention has also been at the forefront of the rules
on State complicity in grave crimes. The Genocide Convention is one of
130. Commentary to the First Geneva Convention, supra note 129, at ¶ 153.
131. AUST, supra note 3, at 388.
132. Id. at 389.
133. See Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal [Lower House of Parliament], Aanhang-
sel van de Handelingen [Appendix to the Acts], Vragen Gesteld door de Leden der
Kamer, met de Daarop door de Regering Gegeven Antwoorden [Questions Asked by
the Members of the House, with the Answers Given by the Government], No. 1177,
Vergaderjaar [Meeting Year] 2015–16.
134. Comm’n on Human Rights, Rep. on the Fortieth Session, U.N. Doc. E/1984/14, E/
CN.4/1984/77, at 21 (1984).
135. Theodor Meron, The Geneva Conventions as Customary Law, 81 AM. J. INT’L L.
348, 355 (1987) (discussing U.S.  responsibility for actions in Nicaragua).
2018] THE DUTY TO REFRAIN 143
the few human rights treaties that explicitly prohibit complicity.136
Article III of the Convention lists “complicity in genocide” as one of
five punishable acts, but it does not define it.137 Traditionally, this
provision was understood to require States to punish individuals who
were complicit in genocidal acts.138 Yet, when Ago proposed the adop-
tion of a draft article on State complicity in 1978, he used the case
where a State provides weapons to another State to aid its commission
of genocide as an example of State complicity and queried whether the
reference to complicity in the Genocide Convention included State
complicity.139
This expanded understanding has now gained acceptance by au-
thorities on international law. The ICJ has played a fundamental role
in advancing State responsibility for complicity in genocide pursuant
to Article III of the Genocide Convention. In an advisory opinion in
1951, the ICJ concluded that the Genocide Convention did not include
any new commitments regarding genocide; rather, it formally codified
obligations that were already binding on States as part of customary
international law.140 Some fifty years later in the Bosnian Genocide
Case, the ICJ interpreted the complicity referenced in Article III of the
Genocide Convention to include both individual and State responsibil-
ity.141 In that case, Bosnia and Herzegovina alleged that the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) provided political, financial, and mili-
tary resources and encouragement to its agents and surrogates includ-
ing the authorities of Republika Srpska in order to facilitate the
commission of genocide in Srebrenica.142 The court thus addressed
whether the FRY was complicit in the genocide perpetrated by Repub-
lika Srpska.143
The ICJ found that the Genocide Convention imposed an obligation
on States not to be complicit in genocide.144 The Court expressly
linked the provision in the Genocide Convention to the ILC’s general
rule on State complicity, concluding that there was:
no reason to make any distinction of substance between ‘complicity in geno-
cide’, within the meaning of Article III, paragraph (e), of the [Genocide] Con-
136. Nahapetian, supra note 40, at 122.
137. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide art III,
Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277; see Paulo Palchetti, State Responsibility for Com-
plicity in Genocide, in THE UN GENOCIDE CONVENTION: A COMMENTARY 381,
381–82 (Paola Gaeta ed., 2009).
138. AUST, supra note 3, at 390.
139. Palchetti, supra note 137, at 381–82 (citing Seventh Report on State Responsibil-
ity by Roberto Ago, Special Rapporteur, U.N. A/CN.4/SER.A/1978/Add.1 (Part 1)
(1978)).
140. AUST, supra note 3, at 391.
141. Bosnian Genocide Case, supra note 37, at ¶ 167.
142. JACKSON, supra note 1, at 202.
143. Id. at 203.
144. Id.
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vention and the ‘aid or assistance’ of a State in the commission of a wrongful
act by another State within the meaning of the aforementioned Article 16.145
IV. CONNECTION TO THE RESPONSIBILITY TO
PROTECT (R2P)
Despite being a well-established principle of international law, the
duty to refrain from aiding and abetting the grave crimes of other
States has received minimal attention from legal scholars and policy-
makers. It has been largely overshadowed by another related guiding
principle in international law: R2P.
A. Defining R2P
R2P is broadly defined as the normative proposition that while
States have the primary duty to protect their own citizens from
human rights abuses, if they are unwilling or unable to do so, the in-
ternational community has a responsibility to protect these citi-
zens.146 The international community created R2P in the aftermath of
the egregious atrocities in Bosnia and Rwanda, where the interna-
tional community failed to intervene even when it was clear that geno-
cide was underway.147 Following those atrocities, in a 2000 report,
then U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan raised the question: “[I]f hu-
manitarian intervention is, indeed, an unacceptable assault on sover-
eignty, how should we respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica—to gross
and systematic violations of human rights that offend every precept of
our common humanity?”148
In response to this call, Canadian Prime Minister Jean Chre´tien
convened the International Commission on Intervention and State
Sovereignty (ICISS), which aimed to build an “international consen-
sus on how to respond in the face of massive violations of human
rights and humanitarian law.”149 In its report in 2001, the ICISS de-
fined R2P as “an idea that sovereign States have a responsibility to
protect their own citizens from avoidable catastrophe—from mass
145. Bosnian Genocide Case, supra note 37, at ¶ 420.
146. The “Responsibility to Protect” doctrine was first outlined in 2001 in a report
commissioned by the Canadian government. See generally Int’l Comm’n on Inter-
vention & State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to Protect (Dec. 2001), http://
responsibilitytoprotect.org/ICISS%20Report.pdf [hereinafter ICISS]. For more in-
formation about the origins of R2P, see Rachel Lo´pez, The Judicial Expansion of
American Exceptionalism, 6 DUKE F.L. & SOC. CHANGE 1 (2014).
147. William W. Burke-White, Adoption of the Responsibility to Protect, in THE RE-
SPONSIBILITY OF STOPPING MASS ATROCITIES IN OUR TIME 18 (Jared Genser & Ir-
win Cotler eds., Oxford Univ. Press Oct. 2011); see Saira Mohamed, Taking Stock
of the Responsibility to Protect, 48 STAN. J. INT’L L. 319, 321–22 (2012).
148. KOFI ANNAN, WE THE PEOPLES: THE ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS IN THE 21ST
CENTURY 48 (2000).
149. Burke-White, supra note 147, at 18–19 (quoting ICISS, supra note 146, at 81).
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murder and rape, from starvation—but that when they are unwilling
or unable to do so, the responsibility must be borne by the broader
community of [S]tates.”150 The ICISS laid out a range of measures—
including economic sanctions and criminal prosecutions—that States
could take to fulfill their responsibility to protect, but primarily fo-
cused on military intervention.151 However, military intervention was
only permissible if it had “(1) Security Council authorization, (2) Gen-
eral Assembly authorization under the Uniting for Peace procedure, or
(3) post hoc Security Council authorization for intervention by a re-
gional organization.”152
Since the release of the ICISS report, R2P has gained increased
recognition as a guiding principle of international law. In 2005, after a
U.N. World Summit, the U.N. General Assembly unanimously
adopted the World Summit Outcome Document, which affirmed that
the international community “has the responsibility to use appropri-
ate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means” to protect
populations from only four specific violations: genocide, war crimes,
ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity.153 In contrast to the
ICISS report, the World Summit Outcome document scaled back R2P
with respect to military intervention, indicating that the international
community should be “prepared to take collective action, in a timely
and decisive manner, through the Security Council, in accordance
with the [U.N.] Charter . . . .” as opposed to having an affirmative duty
to do so.154 The World Summit Outcome Document also emphasized
the need to help States to “build capacity to protect their populations
from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against hu-
manity and to assisting those which are under stress before crises and
conflicts break out.”155
The U.N. Security Council has expressed its support for this artic-
ulation of R2P. In Resolution 1674, the Security Council reaffirmed
the provisions in paragraphs 138 and 139 of the 2005 World Summit
Outcome Document.156 Notably, paragraph 139 of the World Summit
Outcome Document specified that the international community could
only take collective action “through the Security Council, in accor-
150. ICISS, supra note 146, at VIII.
151. Id. at 8 (stating that in addition to military intervention, R2P includes “all forms
of preventive measures, and coercive intervention measures—sanctions and
criminal prosecutions—falling short of military intervention.”).
152. Peter Tzeng, Humanitarian Intervention at the Margins: An Examination of Re-
cent Incidents, 50 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 415, 423 (2017).
153. World Summit Outcome, G.A. Res. 60/1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/1, at ¶ 139 (Sept. 16,
2005) [hereinafter World Summit Outcome Document].
154. Id.
155. World Summit Outcome Document, supra note 153.
156. S.C. Res. 1674, ¶ 4 (Apr. 28, 2006).
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dance with the Charter, including Chapter VII . . . .”157 Since then, the
Security Council has referenced the R2P in a number of resolutions
authorizing collective action, including, notably, a resolution imposing
a no-fly zone in Libya that ultimately helped topple the regime of
Colonel Muammar al-Qaddafi.158
In 2009, then Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon issued a report out-
lining the three pillars of R2P.159 Namely, the report delineated the
following responsibilities: (1) States have an enduring responsibility
to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleans-
ing, and crimes against humanity; (2) the international community
has a responsibility to assist States in fulfilling that duty; and
(3) Member States have a responsibility “to respond collectively in a
timely and decisive manner when a State is manifestly failing to pro-
vide such protection.”160 In later reports on R2P, he emphasized that
military intervention was only possible after authorization by the Se-
curity Council.161
B. R2P’s Intrinsic Connection to D2R
R2P has an intrinsic connection to D2R. First, they both address
jus cogens norms.162 As noted above, the World Summit Outcome Doc-
ument limited R2P to only four crimes: genocide, war crimes, ethnic
cleansing, and crimes against humanity.163 These crimes, by their na-
ture, violate jus cogens norms.164 Second, if a State fails to uphold its
negative obligation under D2R, then per se it has also failed to meet
its positive obligations under R2P. As the ICISS report pointed out,
R2P includes an accompanying responsibility to prevent gross human
rights violations.165 If a State assists another State to commit grave
157. World Summit Outcome Document, supra note 153.
158. For a list of Security Council resolutions that mention R2P, see UNITED NATIONS,
THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT, http://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/rwanda/
about/bgresponsibility.shtml [https://perma.unl.edu/EX4S-VAXM]. For a critical
perspective of R2P and whether it played a role in the intervention in Libya, see
generally, Mohamed, supra note 145.
159. UN Secretary-General, Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, U.N. Doc. A/
63/677 (Jan. 12, 2009) [hereinafter Implementing R2P].
160. Id. at 8–10.
161. Tzeng, supra note 152, at 424–25.
162. Eyal Benvenisti, Sovereigns as Trustees of Humanity: On the Accountability of
States to Foreign Stakeholders, 107 AM. J. INT’L L. 295, 297 n.9 (2013) (“Various
grounds have been invoked for this principle, including jus cogens and erga
omnes obligations.”) (citing Jutta Brunnee & Stephen J. Toope, The Responsibil-
ity to Protect and the Use of Force: Building Legality?, 2 GLOBAL RESP. TO PRO-
TECT, 191, 206–07 (2010)).
163. World Summit Outcome Document, supra note 153.
164. Benvenisti, supra note 160, at 333 (“Various grounds have been invoked for this
principle, including jus cogens and erga omnes obligations.”).
165. ICISS, supra note 144, at ¶ 3.1.
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crimes against its own people, then that assisting State clearly has
not met its obligation to prevent those crimes under R2P.
The International Court of Justice (ICJ) concluded as much in the
Bosnian Genocide Case. In that case, the ICJ found that if a State was
complicit in acts of genocide, then that State also violated its treaty-
based duty to prevent genocide.166 The ICJ explained if a State is re-
sponsible for complicity in genocide, “then there is no point in asking
whether it complied with its obligation of prevention in respect of the
same acts, because logic dictates that a State cannot have satisfied an
obligation to prevent genocide in which it actively participated.”167
Still, there are a few notable differences between State complicity
in genocide and failure to prevent genocide. At least according to the
ICJ, complicity requires some positive action, whereas a breach of the
duty to prevent genocide can result from either a positive action or an
omission.168 Additionally, in contrast to complicity in genocide, which
requires at least knowledge of the facts, a violation of the duty to pre-
vent genocide can be found even when the assisting State did not
know that its actions might facilitate genocide.169 Consequently,
whereas a complicit State necessarily is in violation of R2P, a State
that does not meet its R2P obligations, is not necessarily complicit.
C. Why the Focus on R2P?
In stark contrast to R2P, D2R has been largely overlooked. Even
the handful of scholars that have addressed D2R focused primarily on
the broader rule against State complicity, rather than the more spe-
cific prohibition against aiding and abetting other States that perpe-
trate grave crimes. The concentrated focus on R2P can, in part, be
attributed to the reactive nature of positive law generation.
Particularly in the aftermath of tragedy, States and the interna-
tional community on the whole often feel the need to “do something”
(or at least say that they do).170 In many ways, the history of R2P,
which was created in the wake of genocide in Rwanda and Srebrenica,
reflects this impulse to act after mass atrocity. While the impulse to
react may be understandable, in some cases even honorable, when
166. Bosnian Genocide Case, supra note 37, at ¶ 382.
167. Id.
168. Id. (“[C]omplicity always requires that some positive action has been taken to
furnish aid or assistance to the perpetrators of the genocide, while a violation of
the obligation to prevent results from mere failure to adopt and implement suita-
ble measures to prevent genocide from being committed.”).
169. AUST, supra note 3, at 402.
170. Oona A. Hathaway & Scott J. Shapiro, On Syria, a U.N. Vote Isn’t Optional, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 3, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/04/opinion/on-syria-a-
un-vote-isnt-optional.html (“The desire to respond to the atrocities in Syria with
force is natural. The slaughter of civilians is impossible to watch without feeling
morally impelled to act.”).
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that “something” is military intervention, one of the tools at R2P’s dis-
posal, it can be counterproductive at best and deadly at worst. It may
escalate violence and civil strife. As the examples of the military inter-
vention in Iraq and Libya demonstrate, the instability and power vac-
uums that sometimes follow military intervention can give rise to
increased human rights abuses.171
In some cases, refraining from assisting others to do wrong might
be a more effective way to limit casualties and restrain bloodthirsty
State actors. This is likely to be the case when States would like to
take action due to humanitarian concerns but have determined that
no effective military solutions exist. One recent example of such a di-
lemma occurred when the United States wished to intervene in Syria
after the Assad regime crossed a “red line” by using chemical weapons
against its own people, but determined that military intervention
would only further aggravate the suffering of the Syrian people.172
D. Incorporating D2R into the Humanitarian Intervention
Dilemma
The incorporation of D2R into the calculus of whether military in-
tervention is warranted when other States commit mass atrocity
would result in more comprehensive and rational decision-making.173
In the face of what Carlos Santiago Nino called “radical evil,” States—
acting through the Security Council or unilaterally—are at times too
quick to jump to military action even when it endangers lives, and do
not fully think through creative alternatives that could limit the im-
pact of would-be human rights abusers by depriving them of their in-
strumentality.174 D2R creates much needed space for States that feel
compelled to act in the wake of gross human rights violations to reflect
171. Alan J. Kuperman, Obama’s Libya Debacle: How a Well-Meaning Intervention
Ended in Failure, FOREIGN AFF. MAG., 2015, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/arti-
cles/libya/obamas-libya-debacle (“In retrospect, Obama’s intervention in Libya
was an abject failure, judged even by its own standards. Libya has not only failed
to evolve into a democracy; it has devolved into a failed [S]tate. Violent deaths
and other human rights abuses have increased severalfold.”); Iraq: A Decade of
Abuses, Amnesty Int’l, AI Index MDE 14/001/2013 (April 9, 2013), https://
www.amnestyusa.org/reports/iraq-a-decade-of-abuses/ [https://perma.unl.edu/
3J6X-PS82].
172. Lesley Clark, At West Point, Obama Argues for Restraint in Use of Military,
MIAMI HERALD (May 28, 2014), http://www.miamiherald.com/latest-news/article
1965132.html [https://perma.unl.edu/5HZW-EYU2].
173. In contrast to R2P, scholars frequently evoke the term humanitarian interven-
tion, to reference “the use of force by a [S]tate, a group of [S]tates, or an interna-
tional organization in the territory of another [S]tate for the purpose of ending
gross violations of human rights in the absence of a Security Council authoriza-
tion, a claim of self-defense, or the consent of the host [S]tate.” Tzeng, supra note
152, at 426 (emphasis added).
174. See generally CARLOS SANTIAGO NINO, RADICAL EVIL (1998).
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on the efficacy of that decision. D2R essentially requires a two-step
process where States contemplating humanitarian intervention,
through the Security Council or otherwise, must first engage in an
analysis of whether such action will do more harm than good. In other
words, stricter adherence to D2R principles would encourage States to
examine critically how military intervention would curtail human
rights violations before engaging in the use of force.
D2R also helps to fill in some of the legal gaps that R2P leaves.
While some understand R2P to authorize humanitarian intervention
anytime gross violations of human rights occur, there is not sufficient
legal foundation to establish such a sweeping application of R2P.175
Instead, the World Summit Outcome Document, which the U.N Secur-
ity Council has endorsed, “reinforces the legal obligations of Member
States to refrain from the use of force except in conformity with the
[U.N.] Charter.”176 The U.N. Charter prohibits the use of force with a
few exceptions, namely in self-defense, when a State consents to for-
eign intervention—for example in a status of forces agreement or
when the Security Council sanctions it in the name of collective secur-
ity.177 Furthermore, in Military and Paramilitary Activities, the ICJ
expressly held that humanitarian objectives alone cannot justify the
use of force under international law.178 Thus, the consensus among
jurists and scholars is that there is insufficient State practice and
opinio juris to support the existence of a customary norm of humanita-
rian intervention, absent authorization from the U.N. Security
Council.179
Relying on the assent of the U.N. Security Council is an incomplete
solution to gross human rights violations. Afterall, it was the Security
Council’s inaction in the face of the mass atrocities in Rwanda and
Bosnia that led to the creation of R2P in the first place.180 At the same
time, a broader understanding of the R2P, which would allow coun-
tries to use force absent Security Council authorization, is also un-
175. See, e.g., Carsten Stahn, Responsibility to Protect: Political Rhetoric or Emerging
Legal Norm?, 101 AM. J. INT’L L. 99, 120 (2007) (“[T]he doctrine does not have the
requisite [S]tate practice and opinio juris to support its existence in international
law”); Tzeng, supra note 152, at 421 (“[M]ost scholars agree that humanitarian
intervention does not have a legal basis in international law”).
176. Implementing R2P, supra note 159, at 5.
177. Tzeng, supra note 152, at 422.
178. Id. at 429–31 (quoting Nicaragua Case, supra note 135, at ¶ 268).
179. Id.
180. Mohamed, supra note 147, at 325 (“The greater obstacle was convincing the mem-
bers of the Security Council to use their powers, to sacrifice political capital, re-
sources, or even lives to protect individuals in far-off places. The ICISS therefore
sought to reframe questions about intervention in order to inculcate an under-
standing in all [S]tates, and especially in powerful [S]tates, that protecting indi-
viduals from harm was a matter of duty, regardless of particular national
interests.”).
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workable because as Lea Brilmayer points out, it would essentially
require all countries to monitor compliance with international law
across the globe and intervene anywhere there is a violation of human
rights.181 She contends that the sheer volume of human rights viola-
tions worldwide makes that proposition unwieldy and impractica-
ble.182 More likely, States will choose to intervene when it suits them,
which raises a separate concern about the selective application of the
R2P principle.183
The concern about selection enforcement may also arise even when
the U.N. Security Council has sanctioned military intervention for hu-
manitarian reasons. As legal scholar Saira Mohamed points out, after
the Security Council’s adoption of Resolution 1973, which imposed a
no-fly zone in Libya, then-President Obama argued that the United
States had a “responsibility to act.” At the same time, he stated that
the United States is “naturally reluctant to use force to solve the
world’s many challenges. But when our interests and values are at
stake, we have a responsibility to act.”184 While some have lauded the
adoption of this resolution and Obama’s subsequent statements as an
endorsement of R2P, Mohamed raises an important critique. She fears
that in line with this precedence, the Security Council will only inter-
vene when the national interest of its members motivates them to do
so without any consistent commitment.185 If the Security Council does
not dependably evoke R2P, there is a risk that it will become a vehicle
for the permanent members of the Security Council to accomplish im-
perialist agendas and military objectives in the name of human
rights.186
Because D2R does not require intervention, military or otherwise,
it does not have the same political or economic costs as R2P. For that
reason, States are more likely to evoke the principle consistently. Also,
because D2R is a negative obligation, requiring States to refrain from
activity, it provides a more realistic alternative to R2P, which puts the
Security Council in the position of being the world’s police. Pursuant
to D2R, States are primarily responsible for their actions and must
first do no harm. Only after careful consideration and thoughtful
181. Lea Brilmayer & Isaias Yemane Tesfalidet, Third State Obligations and the En-
forcement of International Law, 44 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 1, 38 (2011).
182. Id. at 39–41.
183. Mohamed, supra note 147, at 332.
184. President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President in Address to Nation on
Libya (Mar. 28, 2011) (transcript available at https://obamawhitehouse.archives.
gov/the-press-office/2011/03/28/remarks-president-address-nation-libya [https://
perma.unl.edu/9JHL-2RAG]).
185. Mohamed, supra note 147, at 321, 330.
186. Id. at 321; see also Harold Koh, The War Powers and Humanitarian Intervention,
53 HOUS. L. REV. 971, 1003 (2016) (explaining his fear that States could use
“murky concepts of humanitarian intervention and R2P for their own self-inter-
ested purposes”).
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weighing of the advantages and disadvantages, may the international
community engage in humanitarian intervention. D2R mandates that
States first explore other solutions that could curtail violence, such as
withdrawing foreign aid or halting all sales of arms that might facili-
tate violence and human rights abuses.
V. OBSTACLES TO PUNISHING STATE ACCOMPLICES
Despite the firm legal foundation that supports a more specific pro-
hibition on State complicity in jus cogens violations, the judicial en-
forcement of this principle is weak.187 By way of example, in its
February 2007 review of decisions by international courts and other
bodies invoking ARSIWA, the U.N. Secretary-General identified only
one case in which ARSIWA’s definition of State complicity for the acts
of other States was referenced by an international body.188 Part of the
problem is that States rarely bring cases involving State complicity
because the current international legal order is not conducive to
them.189 Still, weak enforcement is not an indication that D2R does
not rise to the level of binding international law.190 Rather, it is an
indication of the need to strengthen the judicial and other avenues for
enforcement.
The next two sections are devoted to this. In order to move the nee-
dle forward with respect to enforcement of D2R, in this Part I explore
some of the obstacles to punishing State accomplices. In Part VI, I
propose a number of solutions that will help to improve enforcement of
D2R.
A. The Methods of Enforcing International Law
Much has been written about the variety of forces that encourage
compliance with international human rights law. Derek Jinks and
187. AUST, supra note 3, at 269 (“Due to some procedural peculiarities before interna-
tional courts and tribunals, it could prove to be difficult to hold a complicit State
responsible in international judicial forums.”); id. at 376 (“Given the structure of
Article 16 ASR and the obstacles attached to its implementation, especially
before international courts and tribunals, Article 16 ASR may appear as some
form of ‘window dressing,’ pretending to tackle a pressing issue but offering mod-
est returns in terms of concrete and practical consequences.”).
188. U.N. Secretary-General, Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful
Acts: Compilation of Decisions of International Courts, Tribunals and Other Bod-
ies: Rep. of the Secretary-General, ¶ 85, U.N. Doc. A/62/62 (Feb. 1, 2007) (citing
Panel Report, Turkey—Restrictions on Imports of Textile and Clothing Products,
WT/DS34/R ¶ 9.43 (May 31, 1999)). Notably, the ICJ decided the Bosnian Geno-
cide case in February of 2007, so it was not included in this tally.
189. LANOVOY, supra note 27, at 300.
190. AUST, supra note 3, at 296 (“The mere fact that no judicial avenue exists to hold a
State responsible does not change the fact that there exists international
responsibility.”).
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Ryan Goodman have focused on the soft enforcement through accul-
turation and socialization.191 Oona Hathaway and Scott Shapiro have
identified “outcasting,” that is, denying the benefits of social coopera-
tion and membership to actors that violate international law, as an
effective strategy to promote compliance with international law.192
While this Article focuses primarily on what Jinks and Goodman
label coercive enforcement, or what I call hard enforcement (e.g. the
adjudication of rights in international or domestic courts, economic
sanctions, etc.), this is not meant to undermine the value of soft en-
forcement to norm internalization. Ideally, the design of soft and hard
enforcement mechanisms would be complementary, with each pushing
States toward internalized compliance. As Harold Koh points out,
norm internalization is the preferred strategy of any regulatory sys-
tem because it is low cost, but highly effective.193 Vaughan Lowe ex-
plained the benefits of norm internalization with respect to State
complicity, stating:
The bonds that tie us most effectively are those of which we are least aware,
those with which we comply out of sheer habit. If I am right in believing that
Article 16 ascribes responsibility to States, in some circumstances at least, for
unlawful acts that are facilitated by the provision of foreign aid . . . it is likely
that before very long it will become a matter of routine in donor States to
review the legality of conduct of the recipient State that is materially facili-
tated by that aid. Such a bureaucratisation of the monitoring of compliance
with international law, partial as it might be, would make a significant contri-
bution to the entrenchment of the rule of law in the international
community.194
There is at least some evidence that States have already internalized
the rule on State complicity.195
I focus on hard enforcement mechanisms in this Article because
often they are the first step in the transnational legal process, which
slowly progresses toward norm internalization.196 So while this Arti-
cle focuses on hard enforcement measures, it does so with an eye to-
ward ensuring that it complements and fortifies soft enforcement
mechanisms like acculturation and norm internalization.
B. Inherent Obstacles to Enforcement of Human Rights Law
There are a number of inherent challenges in enforcing interna-
tional law that become even more acute when it comes to enforcing
191. See generally Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, How to Influence States: Socializa-
tion and International Human Rights Law, 54 DUKE L.J. 621, 622 (2004).
192. See generally Oona Hathaway & Scott J. Shapiro, Outcasting: Enforcement in Do-
mestic and International Law, 121 YALE L.J. 252, 255 (2011).
193. Harold Koh, The 1998 Frankel Lecture: Bringing International Law Home, 35
HOUS. L. REV. 623, 629 (1998).
194. See Lowe, supra note 20, at 14.
195. MOYNIHAN, supra note 10, at 4 (citing JACKSON, supra note 1, at 172).
196. Koh, supra note 193, at 644.
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international human rights law. The primary challenge is the decen-
tralized nature of international law. There is no central lawmaking
body, tribunal, or single enforcer of the rules.197 Since there is no
overarching enforcer of international law, the enforcement of State re-
sponsibility has been primarily accomplished through bilateral trea-
ties.198 Indeed, empirical studies have found that compliance with
bilateral treaties is higher than with multilateral treaties because bi-
lateral treaties do not require enforcement by a third party.199
Instead, bilateral treaties are enforced through “joint gains” and
reciprocity. Bilateral treaties are said to be self-enforcing because the
parties will adhere to an agreement when each party has more to gain
from continuing the agreement than from abrogating it.200 A bilateral
system of enforcement thus relies on the correlative rights and obliga-
tions owed between the parties to an agreement.201 If a party
breaches the agreement, then the other party will either stop fulfilling
its obligations under the agreement or at least reduce the flow of bene-
fits arising under the agreement.202 So while there may be short-term
benefits to breaching an agreement, the theory is that a State party
will be deterred from breaching because the long-term costs of losing
the reciprocal benefits of the agreement are greater than the short-
term gains of a breach.203 Bilateral treaties thus allow actors to real-
ize long-term joint gains that they cannot otherwise achieve absent
the agreement.204 Reciprocity is thus an essential component of any
bilateral agreement.
The significant reputational costs of breaching a bilateral agree-
ment are also a deterrent.205 States are sometimes discouraged from
breaching agreements even when it would be to their advantage to do
so because they fear that they will be viewed as unreliable or bad faith
actors and other States will not want to enter into agreements with
them. Yet, reciprocal compliance strategies are often ineffective when
it comes to human rights enforcement. The joint gains and reciprocity
theories of enforcement have much less traction when it comes to
human rights law.206 As traditionally cast, governments have few in-
centives to enter into bilateral agreements with other countries that
197. BETH A. SIMMONS, MOBILIZING FOR HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL LAW IN DO-
MESTIC POLITICS 91, 114 (2009).
198. AUST, supra note 3, at 13.
199. See, e.g., Oona A. Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make A Difference?, 111
Yale L.J. 1935 (2002).
200. SIMMONS, supra note 197, at 116.
201. JACKSON, supra note 1, at 13.
202. SIMMONS, supra note 197, at 116.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 125.
205. Id. at 117.
206. Id. at 125.
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alter how they treat their own people. This is because countries do not
rely on other countries to set their internal standard of rights.207
Human rights treaties are seen as regulating activities that affect the
common good as opposed to individual State interests and are often
multilateral, rather than bilateral.
Multilateral human rights treaties face additional barriers to en-
forcement, which result in a compliance deficit. They often suffer from
a collective action problem. Peer enforcement by State parties is weak
because the costs of enforcement are high and the benefits of compli-
ance are minimal.208 Other State parties are deterred from interven-
ing when a violation of a human rights treaty occurs because
enforcement is expensive militarily, economically, and politically.209
In addition, States may have divergent opinions about the gravity of
violations and different relationships with the offending regime. For
example, a State party may not want to punish a human rights abus-
ing State if it is an ally or trading partner. Thus, the targets of human
rights enforcement are generally smaller countries with little political
power or economic might.210 In addition, the reputational costs of
breaching a human rights treaty as compared to other types of trea-
ties are minimal.211 As Downs and Jones have explained, compliance
with trade agreements is not highly correlated with compliance with
human rights treaties, so a State would not necessarily assume that
because another State breaches a human rights treaty that it will also
be an unreliable trading partner.212
C. The Collective Action Problem with Respect to State
Complicity
The same collective action problem that plagues human rights
treaties also ails the enforcement of the rules on State complicity. Nu-
merous scholars portray bilateralism as the main obstacle to both the
adoption and enforcement of State complicity rules, generally. First,
they attribute the late emergence of the law on State complicity in
international wrongdoing to the bilateral nature of international
law.213 The development of a rule on State responsibility for complic-
ity, according to the standard argument, was delayed because under a
bilateral enforcement regime, the rights and responsibilities of third
States remained undefined.214 Indeed, the inclusion of the obligation
207. Id. at 122.
208. Id. at 122, 125.
209. Id. at 122.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 124.
212. Id.
213. AUST, supra note 3, at 12–14.
214. Id.
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not to assist in the commission of international crimes in the 1996
Draft Articles of the ILC was characterized as “a remarkable victory of
community interest over bilateralist reflexes,” precisely because it im-
pacted the rights and duties of “third States.”215
Legal scholars attribute the lack of enforcement of State complicity
rules to bilateralism. For example, Helmut Phillip Aust asserts that
effective implementation of the rules on State complicity is lacking be-
cause of the bilateral orientation of international judicial proceed-
ings.216 This critique is not unfounded. As I will detail below, the ICJ
is not equipped to resolve disputes that involve a multiplicity of actors
and as a result, cannot adequately address the complexity of the mod-
ern world where the cooperation of States has increased.217 Similarly,
the pacta tertiis rule, which limits treaty obligations to State parties,
means that non-party third States enjoy impunity.218 As a result of
this consent-oriented system of international dispute resolution, even
egregious examples of State complicity will escape punishment.219 To
scholars advocating for rules on State complicity, bilateralism is the
evil that prevents States from acting in the common good of the global
community. For example, in Miles Jackson’s view, the bilateral focus
of international law has resulted in States paying “attention only to
the wrongs they commit and not to the wrongs they help other [S]tates
to commit.”220
The rejection of bilateralism and full embrace of multilateral
agreements might be shortsighted. Multilateral agreements pose
some inherent risks. Because of the structural flaws of the United Na-
tions, which rests decision-making authority with the Security Coun-
cil when peace and security are threatened, the chances that State
complicity will be addressed collectively are slim.221 In the face of Se-
curity Council inaction, States may be emboldened to act unilaterally,
but in the name of the international community. To some extent, in-
ternational law permits this response. When a breach of jus cogens
norms occurs, States have a right, pursuant to their erges omnes obli-
gations, to employ countermeasures (at least as long as they do not
involve the use of force).222 In theory, these countermeasures are
taken in the collective interest of the international community as the
breaches constitute a threat to peace and security, which concerns all
States.223
215. Id. at 25.
216. Id. at 378.
217. Id.
218. JACKSON, supra note 1, at 13.
219. AUST, supra note 3, at 378.
220. JACKSON, supra note 1, at 174.
221. AUST, supra note 3, at 367–69.
222. Id. at 367.
223. Id.
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Unfortunately, there is a risk that States enforcing the rules on
State complicity will justify actions taken in their own self-interest as
acts taken on behalf of the world community.224 Numerous scholars
have articulated this fear. Special Rapporteur Millem Riphagen wor-
ries that States might take it upon themselves to become the world’s
policeman on behalf of the international community, just as they have
with R2P.225 Michael Akehurst has expressed concern that interven-
ing States will “tend to support their allies, rather than the side which
was objectively in the right,” consequently weakening international
law and increasing international tension.226 Or as Miles Jackson put
it, it would give powerful States with resources the right to “form a
world order to their liking.”227
D. Unprincipled Jurisdictional Gaps
One of the biggest obstacles to enforcing the rules on State complic-
ity is the set of jurisdictional hurdles that inhibit courts from adjudi-
cating them.228 Jurisdictional rules limit the ability of both
individuals and other States from bringing cases involving State com-
plicity. The problem is so severe that the ILC has gone so far as saying
“States are entitled to assert complicity in the wrongful conduct of an-
other State even though no international court may have jurisdiction
to rule on the charge.”229
Jurisdictional barriers exist both at the regional and international
levels. The regional systems that adjudicate State responsibility for
human rights violations are often unable to address cases involving
State complicity in internationally wrongful acts due to their reliance
on the territoriality principle. Traditionally, if a court evokes jurisdic-
tion based on the territoriality principle, the offensive act must have
some connection to the offending State’s territory.230 Both the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and the Inter-American human
rights system (composed of the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights (IACHR) and the Inter-American Court of Human
224. Id. at 372.
225. Id. at 367–68.
226. Id. at 370 (quoting Michael Akehurst, Reprisals by Third States, 44 BRIT. Y.B.
INT’L L. 1, 15–16 (1970)).
227. Id.
228. Samuel Shepson, Jurisdiction in Complicity Cases: Rendition and Refoulement in
Domestic and International Courts, 53 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 701, 705–06
(2015) (“But in both international and domestic courts, individuals whose human
rights have been violated with the support of a complicit [S]tate have had their
claims against the complicit [S]tate actor dismissed for want of jurisdiction or as
non-justiciable.”).
229. See Draft Articles, supra note 8, art. 16, cmt. 11, at 67.
230. Michael Akehurst, Jurisdiction in International Law, 46 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 145,
152–53 (1972).
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Rights (IACtHR)) employ this jurisdictional principle and only allow
for extraterritorial application of their respective human rights trea-
ties when a State party has effective control of the jurisdiction where
the human rights violations take place.231
The application of this principle limits these courts’ ability to ad-
dress State complicity. In cases involving State complicity, State ac-
complices are typically aiding and abetting crimes that, by definition,
occur when the State accomplice does not have control over the juris-
diction where the violations occurred. Indeed, one of the reasons that a
State might assist another State to perpetrate grave crimes is because
that State does not have control over a territory or area that impli-
cates its national interest. If a complicit State is facilitating the crimes
of another State in that State’s jurisdiction, it is unlikely that the
State perpetrator will take the complicit State to task for its wrongdo-
ing. As a result, Miles Jackson argues that there is an “unprincipled
gap” in the jurisdictional reach of the ECtHR and the Inter-American
system.232
A similar “unprincipled gap” exists with regard to enforcement of
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). Us-
ing similar language as the jurisdictional provision in the European
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), Article 2 of the ICCPR re-
quires State parties “to respect and to ensure” the rights in the Cove-
nant “to all individuals within its territory and subject to its
jurisdiction.” The State parties to the Covenant deliberately chose this
language. Although France and China opposed its inclusion, the
231. Article 1(1) states that the American Convention on Human Rights covers “all
persons subject to [the] jurisdiction” of the State parties. American Convention on
Human Rights: “Pact of San Jose´, Costa Rica” art. 1(1), Nov. 22, 1969, 1144
U.N.T.S. 144. Yet, the IACHR has held that a State party to the Convention “may
be responsible under certain circumstances for the acts and omissions of its
agents which produce effects or are undertaken outside that [S]tate’s own terri-
tory.” Saldan˜o v. Argentina, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 38/99, OEA/
Ser.L/V/II.95 doc. 7 rev. at ¶ 17 (1999). Instead, the IACHR has also found that
jurisdiction is “a notion linked to authority and effective control, and not merely
to territorial boundaries,” and that the focus should be on whether the State has
“authority” and “control” over the person. Id. at ¶ 19. The American Declaration
does not include a jurisdictional provision, but the Inter-American Commission
has applied the same focus on “authority and control.” See, e.g., Coard v. United
States, Case 10.951, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 109/99, OEA/ser.L/V/
II.106, doc. 3 rev. at ¶ 37 (1999); Alejandre v. Cuba, Case 11.589, Report No. 86/
99, OAS/Ser.L/V/II.104 doc. 10 rev. at ¶ 23 (1999). The ECtHR has established a
similar precedent with regard to extraterritorial jurisdiction. Sarah Miller, for
instance, describes all exceptions to the general requirement that there be a terri-
torial nexus with the signatory State’s physical terrain and the individuals whose
rights are implicated. Sarah Miller, Revisiting Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: A
Territorial Justification for Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Under the European
Convention, 20 EUR. J. INT’L L. 1223 (2009).
232. Miles Jackson, Freeing Soering: The ECHR, State Complicity in Torture and Ju-
risdiction, 27 EUR. J. INT’L L. 817, 821–22 (2016).
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United States insisted on adding “within its territory.”233 In part, the
United States feared that State parties would be emboldened to be-
come the world’s police for human rights violations.234
As a consequence of this addition, the reach of the ICCPR, and
thereby the jurisdiction of the Human Rights Committee that
monitors compliance with the ICCPR, is limited to acts within the ter-
ritory of its State party members. However, in at least one instance,
the Human Rights Committee went further than the ECtHR and the
IACHR in extending its jurisdiction. In Euben Lopez Burgos v. Uru-
guay, the Committee found that Uruguay had violated ICCPR when
its agents abducted its own citizens and transported them back to the
country.235 The Committee reasoned that “the reference in that
[A]rticle is not to the place where the violation occurred, but rather to
the relationship between the individual and the State in relation to a
violation of any of the rights set forth in the Covenant, wherever they
occurred.”236
Arguably, carving out a special rule for D2R could potentially over-
come some jurisdictional limitations present before these decision-
making bodies. Instead of adopting the territoriality principle, these
entities could exercise universal jurisdiction over these cases. By its
very nature, universal jurisdiction requires “no link of territoriality or
nationality between the State and the conduct of the offender, nor is
the State seeking to protect its security or credit.”237 As Cherif Bas-
siouni has asserted, courts have universal jurisdiction over crimes
that violate jus cogens norms “irrespective of where they were commit-
ted, by whom (including Heads of State), against what category of vic-
tims, and irrespective of the context of their occurrence (peace or
war).”238 The underlying legal theory of universal jurisdiction is that
some crimes are so “threatening to the international community or so
heinous in scope and degree that they offend the interest of all human-
ity.”239 Thus, a court exercising universal jurisdiction does not act in
233. Nahapetian, supra note 40, at 112.
234. Id.
235. MANFRED NOWAK, U.N. COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS: CCPR COM-
MENTARY 41 n.73 (1993) (citing Sergio Euben Lopez Burgos v. Uruguay, Comm.
No. R. 12/52, ¶ 12.3 (June 6, 1979), U.N. Doc. Supp. No. 40 (A/36/40), at 176
(1981); Lilian Celiberti de Casariego v. Uruguay, Comm. No. R. 13/56, ¶ 10.3
(July 17, 1979), U.N. Doc. Supp. No. 40 (A/36/40), at 185 (1981)).
236. Sergio Euben Lopez Burgos v. Uruguay, supra note 235, at ¶ 12.2.
237. LUC REYDAMS, UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION: INTERNATIONAL AND MUNICIPAL LEGAL
PERSPECTIVES 5 (2003); see also Ingrid Wuerth, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum
Co.: The Supreme Court and the Alien Tort Statute, 107 AM. J. INT’L L. 601, 619
(2013) (explaining that universal jurisdiction “is not based on (or limited by) an
important or distinct interest of the forum [S]tate”).
238. Bassiouni, supra note 21, at 66.
239. Michael P. Scharf, Application of Treaty-Based Universal Jurisdiction to Nation-
als of Non-Party States, 35 NEW ENG. L. REV. 363, 368 (2001).
2018] THE DUTY TO REFRAIN 159
its own name uti singulus (a special interest), but as an agent of the
international community.240 Thus far, universal jurisdiction has been
limited to criminal prosecutions of individuals in foreign courts, but in
light of the growth of State responsibility, in the future it could extend
to cases involving D2R.
Miles Jackson proposes another novel idea to close this “unprinci-
pled gap.” He argues that the ECtHR jurisprudence, which addresses
torture that occurs extraterritorially, should be extended to other
crimes that implicate jus cogens norms.241 The seminal case on this
subject is the Soering case. In that case, the ECtHR held that a State
who extradites an individual could be held liable if it was reasonably
foreseeable that the claimant could face a real risk of torture or inhu-
man and degrading treatment in the receiving State.242 Jackson ar-
gues that the Seoring principle should be re-imagined as “a preventive
complicity rule,” which could possibly be extended to cases where the
conduct of a complicit State will foreseeably result in a violation of a
fundamental right enshrined in the ECHR.243 The ECtHR held as
much when it concluded that State parties were complicit in torture in
violation of the ECHR when they assisted another State who engaged
in torture. Specifically, in El-Masri, Al Nashiri, and Husayn, the
ECtHR concluded that Macedonia, Romania, and Poland violated the
ECHR when they assisted the United States to carry out its rendition
program because it was foreseeable that those rendered would be
tortured.244
In addition to the jurisdictional gaps at the ECtHR, the IASHR,
and the Human Rights Committee, there is also a significant gap in
the jurisdictional reach of the ICJ, which prevents it from adjudicat-
ing many cases involving State complicity. Specifically, in the Case of
the Monetary Gold, the ICJ ruled that it could not adjudicate a liabil-
ity claim if in order to do so it would have to rule on the lawfulness of
the conduct of another State who was not a party in the proceedings
and had not consented to the Court’s jurisdiction.245 The Monetary
240. Georges Abi-Saab, The Proper Role of Universal Jurisdiction, 1 J. INT’L CRIM.
JUST. 3, 596, 601 (2003).
241. Jackson, supra note 232.
242. Soering v. United Kingdom, App. No. 14038/88, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 30
(1989).
243. Jackson, supra note 232, at 830.
244. Andre´ Nollkaemper, Complicity in International Law: Some Lessons from the
U.S. Rendition Program, 109 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 177, 180 (2015).
245. Monetary Gold Removed from Rome in 1943 (It. v. Fr., U.K., and U.S.), Prelimi-
nary Question, 1954 I.C.J. Rep 19 (June 15). For a discussion of the potential
impact of Monetary Gold on the possibility of the injured State taking counter-
measures against the assisting State, see Christian J. Tams, Countermeasures
Against Multiple Responsible Actors, in PRINCIPLES OF SHARED RESPONSIBILITY IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW: AN APPRAISAL OF THE STATE OF THE ART 331–32 (Andre´
Nollkaemper & Ilias Plakokefalos eds. 2014).
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Gold principle, sometimes called the indispensable third party princi-
ple, reflects the bilateral nature of international law enforcement, in
which there are two parties, with one on either side of a dispute. Since
State complicity intrinsically involves at least three actors, many
cases of State complicity fall into this jurisdictional black hole. The
ILC, in its Commentary to Article 16, recognized that this precedent
could “present some practical difficulties in some cases in establish-
ing” State responsibility under Article 16.246
Even cases that implicate jus cogens norms or obligations erga
omnes are not exempt from the effects of Monetary Gold. Arguably,
because States need not consent to jus cogens norms in order to be
bound by them, Monetary Gold should not affect the Court’s ability to
adjudicate a case involving jus cogens violations. However, the ICJ
has made a distinction between consent to a legal obligation and con-
sent to the ICJ jurisdiction, finding “that the fact that a dispute re-
lates to compliance with [jus cogens norms], which is assuredly the
case with regard to the prohibition of genocide, cannot of itself provide
a basis for the jurisdiction of the Court to entertain that dispute.”247
Similarly, the ICJ has found that the erga omnes character of a norm
and the rule of consent to jurisdiction are not related and as such
would “not rule on the lawfulness of the conduct of a State when its
judgment would imply an evaluation of the lawfulness of the conduct
of another State which is not a party to the case . . . even if the right in
question is a right erga omnes.”248
To some extent, D2R overcomes this obstacle because a number of
jus cogens norms that D2R addresses are codified in treaties, which
include clauses that confer jurisdiction on the ICJ. For example, the
Genocide Convention grants jurisdiction to the ICJ to resolve disputes
concerning responsibility for genocide.249 Similarly, the Convention
against Torture (CAT) includes a jurisdictional clause that allows
State parties to refer a dispute arising under the treaty to the ICJ
should arbitration fail.250 The Slavery Convention and its supplemen-
246. See Draft Articles, supra note 8, art. 16, cmt. 11, at 67.
247. Case Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Re-
public of the Congo v. Rwanda), 2002 I.C.J. 126 (Sept. 18) (New Application:
2002).
248. East Timor (Port. v. Austl.), Judgment, 1995 I.C.J. 90, ¶ 29 (June 30).
249. Article IX of the Genocide Convention provides that the ICJ has jurisdiction in
matters “relating to the interpretation, application or fulfillment of the present
Convention, including those relating to the responsibility of a State for genocide
or for any of the other acts enumerated in article III . . . .” Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide art. IX, Dec. 9, 1948, 78
U.N.T.S. 277.
250. Article 30 of the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or De-
grading Treatment or Punishment provides that “[i]f within six months from the
date of the request for arbitration the Parties are unable to agree on the organi-
zation of the arbitration, any one of those Parties may refer the dispute to the
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tal convention both include provisions stipulating that disputes aris-
ing under these treaties should be referred to the ICJ if these disputes
are unable to be resolved through negotiations.251 Still, all breaching
States are necessary parties to a case involving State complicity, so
both the complicit State and the State perpetrators must be joined to
any case arising from the aforementioned treaties.
VI. PROPOSED ENFORCEMENT OF STATE ACCOMPLICE
LIABILITY
In light of the existing obstacles that prevent State complicity
cases from going forward before the main tribunals that address State
responsibility (e.g. the ICJ, the ECtHr, and the IASHR) and human
rights more generally, I contend that the enforcement of D2R may be
better achieved through other means. This Part proposes other op-
tions for the enforcement of D2R, which must be understood within
the broader frame of the compliance deficit that affects human rights
law more generally.
A. Bilateral Agreements Prohibiting State Complicity in
Grave Crimes
This Article contends that the belief that bilateralism is incompati-
ble with the advancement of collective concerns of the international
community has resulted in a missed opportunity: the enforcement of
State complicity laws through bilateral agreements. Bilateral agree-
ments that incorporate D2R principles hold a lot of potential for more
robust adherence to human rights principles. Generally, the strength
of bilateral enforcement mechanisms centers on the ability of States to
take countermeasures aimed at inducing other States to resume their
obligations or compliance with agreements.252 Under this bilateral
system, when one State breaches an agreement, the injured State is
International Court of Justice by request in conformity with the Statute of the
Court.” Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment art. 30, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85.
251. Article 8 of the Slavery Convention of 1926 requires that disputes, “if they cannot
be settled by direct negotiation, be referred for decision to the Permanent Court
of International Justice.” Slavery Convention of 1926 art. 8, Sept. 25, 1926, 60
L.N.T.S. 253. Similarly, Article 10 of the Supplementary Convention on the Abo-
lition of Slavery provides that “[a]ny dispute between States Parties to this Con-
vention relating to its interpretation or application, which is not settled by
negotiation, shall be referred to the International Court of Justice at the request
of any one of the parties to the dispute, unless the parties concerned agree on
another mode of settlement.” Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slav-
ery, the Slave Trade and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery of 1956
art. 10, Sept. 7, 1956, 226 U.N.T.S. 3.
252. AUST, supra note 3, at 366.
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entitled to self-help measures against the State perpetrator.253 In ad-
dition, these bilateral agreements could include jurisdictional provi-
sions conferring jurisdiction to the ICJ when a dispute occurs, thus
overcoming some of the barriers presented by the Monetary Gold prin-
ciple because both parties would have consented to ICJ jurisdiction
over the dispute.
If D2R was incorporated into bilateral treaties, it could take two
forms. First, a D2R clause could be inserted into foreign aid agree-
ments that would entitle a donor State to suspend or terminate an
agreement if the recipient State committed a grave crime.254 Arms
agreements could also include D2R clauses that would prohibit recipi-
ent States from using the arms they receive in grave crimes, similar to
the provisions in the ATT.255 Whereas typically a State may only ter-
minate or suspend a treaty when the other State commits a material
breach, when the breach of a treaty involves jus cogen violations, the
non-breaching State has an obligation to suspend or terminate the
treaty.256 Pursuant to Draft Article 41(2), States that continue their
assistance or provisions of arms after mass atrocities occur could be
considered accessories after the fact.257 Such clauses would ensure
that donor States are not bound to an aid agreement that might make
them complicit in the grave crimes of other States. In this case, States
are not acting on behalf of the international community, but instead in
their own interest of not wanting to incur responsibility for State
complicity.258
There is some precedence to support the formation of agreements
with these clauses. After learning that Israel had used cluster bombs
in Lebanon, the United States reportedly suspended shipment of
weapons until it negotiated an unpublished agreement, which barred
Israel from using U.S. supplied bombs in civilian areas.259 The
Netherlands suspended economic aid and military subsidies to Suri-
name after evidence of human rights violations emerged.260 The
United States halted aid to Uganda, when it was controlled by notori-
ous human rights abuser Idi Amin, and Indonesia after it invaded
East Timor.261 Codifying this precedence into a standard clause that
States could be encouraged to include in all of their foreign aid agree-
253. Id.
254. Id. at 372.
255. See, e.g., ATT, supra note 125.
256. LANOVOY, supra note 27, at 298.
257. Draft Articles, supra note 8, art. 41(2).
258. AUST, supra note 3, at 372.
259. Cluster bombs are suspect under international humanitarian law because, on ex-
plosion, they indiscriminately scatter small particles of flying metal, frequently
causing injury to civilians. Quigley, supra note 38, at 91.
260. LANOVOY, supra note 27, at 294.
261. Id. at 294–95.
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ments would ostensibly create pressure on principal States to refrain
from abuses, but they would also indirectly constrain potential com-
plicit States wishing to be seen as good faith actors.
Second, a bilateral treaty addressing D2R could also be an effective
strategy when a conflict is entangled with a broader proxy war. In
many of the instances of State complicity mentioned in Part I, the con-
flict escalated because there were States with strategic geopolitical in-
terests on both sides of the conflict acting in the shadows. In these
scenarios, a sort of brinkmanship approach to foreign or military as-
sistance may be at work: when one side becomes involved, the other
feels compelled to aid the actor they support. Our world’s history is
filled with such examples, with the foreign aid strategies of the United
States and Russia during the Cold War being a notable one.262 Some-
times, these power struggles result in powerful State actors support-
ing States with fewer resources to commit grave crimes. This was the
case in Guatemala, where the United States gave aid to Guatemala—
ultimately increasing its capacity to commit atrocities against indige-
nous communities—because it feared that Cuba and Russia were arm-
ing “communists” who would overthrow the Guatemalan
government.263
The creation of a bilateral treaty, where the foreign governments
on either side of a conflict agree not to arm allies who are suspected of
committing grave crimes, might have been an effective strategy in the
intractable conflict in Syria. In August 2012, after President Obama
publicly stated that Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad had crossed “a
red line” when he used chemical weapons on his own people, the
United States contemplated military intervention.264 White House
Counsel under the Obama administration concluded that, under the
circumstances, military intervention was “ ‘justified and legitimate
under international law’ and so not prohibited.”265 Despite these
statements early on, President Obama later expressed his belief that
there was no viable military solution and ultimately intervention
would only aggravate the conflict, thereby resulting in more violations
262. Peter J. Meyer, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44647, U.S. FOREIGN ASSISTANCE TO
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: RECENT TRENDS AND FY2016 APPROPRIA-
TIONS (2016) (“U.S. assistance to [Latin America] spiked in the early 1960s follow-
ing the introduction of President John F. Kennedy’s Alliance for Progress, an
anti-poverty initiative that sought to counter Soviet and Cuban influence in the
aftermath of Fidel Castro’s 1959 seizure of power in Cuba.”).
263. Raymond Bonner, President Approved Policy of Preventing ‘Cuba-Model States,’
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 7, 1983), http://www.nytimes.com/1983/04/07/world/president-
approved-policy-of-preventing-cuba-model-states.html?mcubz=1.
264. Mark Landler, Obama Threatens Force Against Syria, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 20,
2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/21/world/middleeast/obama-threatens-
forceagainstsyria.html.
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of human rights.266 Many other leaders, ranging from Russian Prime
Minister Vladimir Putin to the Pope, came to the same conclusion.267
Particularly in this case, where the forces in opposition to Assad are
believed to have committed their own atrocities, it may be more effec-
tive to limit the capacity of human rights abusers by depriving both
sides of resources.268 In this scenario, where both Russia and the
United States agreed that there was no military solution to the situa-
tion in Syria, might it have been possible to negotiate a bilateral
agreement where both the United States and Russia agreed to refrain
from aiding either side?
While, admittedly, this might be a long shot, there is some reason
to believe that such an agreement might be possible under the right
political circumstances. After all, in July of 2017, U.S. President
Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin negotiated a cease-fire
agreement in southwest Syria.269 Certainly, the motivation for the
agreement was not all altruistic. Part of the impetus for the agree-
ment came from the political pressure that the leaders felt to portray
their first meeting as a success.270 Another example of a possible D2R
forward agreement occurred earlier in 2017 when Russia, Turkey, and
Iran came to an agreement to establish “de-escalation zones” in Syria
in an effort to reduce bloodshed.271
B. Overcoming the Veto Power of the Security Council
As previously mentioned, another compounding factor to the impu-
nity gap for State complicity in grave crimes is the decision-making
structure in the United Nations. The existing system concentrates de-
cision-making authority in the hands of a few powerful States that
exercise veto power in the Security Council (Russia, China, the United
States, France, and the United Kingdom).272 As the examples of State
complicity elucidated above demonstrate, many of these actors have
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been accused of being State accomplices to grave crimes. Indeed, some
of them have used their veto power to protect their allies that commit
atrocities. For example, we saw this recently with the resolutions re-
garding the investigation of the Assad regime’s use of chemical weap-
ons against his people. Russia, which has a geopolitical interest in
Syria, has again and again prevented the United Nations from con-
demning the atrocities in Syria and calling on the Assad regime to
cooperate with an international investigation into the use of chemical
weapons.273 As a result, the world’s security has become threatened
by the Assad regime’s crimes.
In the context of promoting R2P, some scholars have proposed that
the U.N. General Assembly should exercise its authority under the
Uniting for Peace Resolution to counteract the inaction of the Security
Council when grave crimes that threaten collective security occur.
This Resolution provides:
[T]hat if the Security Council, because of lack of unanimity of the permanent
members, fails to exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of
international peace and security in any case where there appears to be a
threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression, the General As-
sembly shall consider the matter immediately with a view to making appro-
priate recommendations to Members for collective measures, including in the
case of a breach of the peace or act of aggression the use of armed force when
necessary, to maintain or restore international peace and security.274
In his report on Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, the
U.N. Secretary General underscored the ability of the General Assem-
bly, acting under the “Uniting for Peace” procedure, to act “when the
Council fails to exercise its responsibility with regard to international
peace and security because of the lack of unanimity among its five
permanent members.”275 The ICJ, in its Certain Expenses and Wall
advisory opinions, affirmed the General Assembly also has responsi-
bility for the maintenance of international peace and security and can
“recommend measures for the peaceful adjustment.”276
Similarly, the ICISS, in its report on R2P, concluded that the Gen-
eral Assembly has fallback authority to take action to maintain peace
and security and concluded that, although the Assembly has only hor-
tatory powers, “an intervention which took place with the backing of a
two-thirds vote in the General Assembly would clearly have powerful
273. Euan McKirdy, 8 Times Russia Blocked a UN Security Council Resolution on
Syria, CNN (Apr. 13, 2017), http://www.cnn.com/2017/04/13/middleeast/russia-
unsc-syria-resolutions/index.html [https://perma.unl.edu/NDC2-3WCL].
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276. Tzeng, supra note 152, at 420 (citing Certain Expenses of the United Nations,
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moral and political support.”277 Furthermore, the ICISS Report char-
acterized the ability of the General Assembly to recommend interven-
tion as an “important additional form of leverage on the Security
Council to encourage it to act decisively and appropriately.”278
Yet, the ability of the General Assembly to act is still restrained by
the prohibition on the use of force. As explained in two later reports by
Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon in 2012 and 2015, “the Security
Council is the sole U.N. organ that has the power to authorize the use
of force, under Chapter VII, Article 42, of the Charter.”279 The Gen-
eral Assembly may only adopt a non-binding resolution urging the use
of force to address a humanitarian crisis.280 However, such a resolu-
tion does not in itself justify the use of force by any State.281 Under
Article 11(2) of the U.N. Charter, the General Assembly may discuss
and recommend actions that it believes will promote international
peace and security but must defer to the Security Council if any mili-
tary intervention is necessary.282
Despite this limitation with respect to military intervention under
R2P, the Uniting for Peace Resolution could be an effective tool for the
implementation of D2R. Indeed, although the Secretary-General has
expressed his view that the Resolution does not permit the General
Assembly to authorize a military intervention, he does view the Gen-
eral Assembly as an appropriate forum to consider sanctions that fall
short of military force.283 The General Assembly thus could be a fo-
rum where individual member States coordinate sanctions against a
State Accomplice to grave crimes when the Security Council fails to
authorize military or other action under R2P.284 In addition, the Gen-
eral Assembly has primary authority over membership in the United
Nations. Article 18 grants the power to suspend the right and privi-
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leges of membership and even to expel member States.285 This too
could be an effective tool in implementing D2R.
VII. CONCLUSION
The United States, United Kingdom, and France have all con-
demned Russia’s involvement in the war crimes perpetrated by the
Assad regime in Syria. Similarly, the international human rights com-
munity has decried China’s role in arming the Sudanese army that
committed mass atrocity in Darfur. Despite the outrage over the role
that these State accomplices have played in the mass murder perpe-
trated by another State, the avenues available to punish these State
accomplices remains limited.
In this Article, I propose a novel theory for closing this impunity
gap. I argue that States have a duty to refrain from aiding and abet-
ting other States who commit jus cogens violations, like genocide and
crimes against humanity. As documented in this Article, there is ro-
bust evidence of the emergence of a binding principle concerning State
responsibility for complicity in the grave crimes of other States, but it
has yet to be treated as a separate principle from the general prohibi-
tion on State complicity in international wrongdoing. I argue that de-
lineating a more specific D2R rule will ensure more effective
enforcement of the principle. In addition, this Article also makes a sig-
nificant contribution to the literature by exploring the factors that
contribute to impunity for State complicity in grave crimes. To resolve
these challenges, I propose an embrace of bilateral agreements. While
these treaties are typically seen as contrary to the rules that govern
State complicity, a bilateral agreement that incorporates provisions
meant to instrumentalize D2R could be an important tool for enforce-
ment. In addition, I argue that the Uniting for Peace Resolution au-
thorizes the General Assembly to take measures to punish State
accomplices, including members of the Security Council who use their
veto power to protect allies that commit grave crimes.
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